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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

 
The State, Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
Christopher Broadnax, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2013-000615 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal From Richland County 
G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge  
Opinion No. 27545 

Heard February 4, 2015 – Refiled July 29, 2015 

REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Julie Kate Kenney and 
Assistant Attorney General Mary Shannon Williams, all 
of Columbia, for Petitioner. 
Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of 
Columbia, for Respondent. 
CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: The State of South Carolina appeals the court of 
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appeals' decision reversing Christopher Broadnax's (Respondent) convictions for 
armed robbery and kidnapping, and remanding for a new trial.  We reverse in part 
and affirm in part the decision of the court of appeals.     
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At 5:30 p.m. on May 24, 2009, a masked gunman entered Church's Chicken 
on Two Notch Road in Columbia.  He held one of the employees at gunpoint while 
the employee emptied the cash registers.  Three other employees locked 
themselves in the kitchen.  The gunman was wearing a striped shirt, had a 
distinctive "lazy eye," and carried a clear plastic bag. 
After the employee filled the bag with money from the registers, the gunman 
calmly exited the store, climbed into a "gray Dodge old model truck" driven by an 
accomplice, and left the scene.  One of the employees chased the gunman outside 
and saw him riding in the passenger seat of the gray truck as the driver pulled out 
of the parking lot onto Two Notch Road.   
Police responded to the scene within approximately three minutes, and based 
on the employees' descriptions of the getaway vehicle, stopped the driver a short 
distance from the Church's Chicken on Two Notch Road.1  When officers 
approached the vehicle, they found Respondent crouched down on the floorboard 
of the passenger side. Officers immediately noticed that Respondent had a "lazy 
eye." The police officers found a gun and a bag full of money (matching the 
employees' descriptions) jammed under the truck's passenger seat, adjacent to 
Respondent. Further, one of the employees identified Respondent as the gunman 
in a "show-up" identification, and testified that he recognized Respondent's
distinctive facial features, build, and clothing.2 
Respondent was charged with one count of armed robbery and four counts 
of kidnapping. 
1 A testifying officer stated that the truck was distinctive because it was in poor 
condition and "had a number of dents and pings and so forth."  
2 Several of the employees also made in-court identifications of Respondent as the 
perpetrator of the crimes. Furthermore, Respondent's accomplice testified against 
him at trial.   
13 

  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
 
After the State rested, Respondent indicated that he would testify in his own 
defense. Consequently, the State moved to admit Respondent's prior criminal 
record for purposes of impeachment. The trial court heard arguments and 
conducted an inquiry into which of Respondent's prior convictions should be 
admitted.  Pursuant to Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE, and the court of appeals' opinion in 
State v. Al–Amin, 353 S.C. 405, 578 S.E.2d 32 (Ct. App. 2003), the trial court 
admitted three of Respondent's four prior armed robbery convictions.3 
During his testimony, Respondent denied any involvement in the robbery.  
However, Respondent's counsel elicited testimony regarding Respondent's prior 
convictions for armed robbery.4  The State likewise questioned Respondent about 
his prior convictions.  
The trial judge then instructed the jury:
You've heard evidence that the defendant was convicted of a crime 
other than the one for which the defendant is now on trial. This 
evidence may be considered by you if you can conclude it is true only 
in deciding whether the defendant's testimony is believable and for no 
other purpose. You must not consider the defendant's prior record as 
any evidence of the defendant's guilt of the charge that we are trying 
here today. 
The jury found Respondent guilty of armed robbery and four counts of 
kidnapping, and the trial judge sentenced Respondent to a mandatory minimum
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based on 
Respondent's prior armed robbery convictions.  
On appeal to the court of appeals, Respondent argued, inter alia, that the 
trial court erred in admitting his prior armed robbery conviction for impeachment 
purposes. See State v. Broadnax, 401 S.C. 238, 241, 736 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ct. 
3 The trial court also admitted Respondent's prior convictions for transaction card 
theft, grand larceny, and petit larceny. 
4 The trial court permitted Respondent's counsel to elicit the prior conviction 
testimony during his direct examination without waiving his objection to the 
admission of that testimony. 
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App. 2013). The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court 
for a new trial. Id.  Specifically, the court of appeals found: (1) Respondent's prior 
armed robbery convictions, without more, did not constitute crimes of dishonesty, 
and therefore, the trial court should have conducted a balancing test prior to 
admitting testimony regarding Respondent's prior armed robbery convictions; and 
(2) such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 244–48, 736 
S.E.2d at 691–93.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I.	 Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that Respondent's
prior armed robbery convictions were not crimes of dishonesty, 
and were therefore inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE? 
II.	 Whether the court of appeals erred in refusing to find any error 
in the admission of Respondent's prior criminal record harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only.  State 
v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006).  The admission or 
exclusion of evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not 
be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.  State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 
557, 564 S.E.2d 87, 93 (2002) (citation omitted); see also State v. Kelly, 319 S.C. 
173, 176, 460 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1995) ("A trial judge has considerable latitude in 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence and his rulings will not be disturbed absent 
a showing of probable prejudice." (citation omitted)).  "An abuse of discretion 
occurs where the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or 
are controlled by an error of law." State v. McDonald, 343 S.C. 319, 325, 540 
S.E.2d 464, 467 (2000) (citation omitted).  
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Prior Armed Robbery Convictions 
The State argues that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court 
because armed robbery is a "crime of dishonesty or false statement" such that it is 
15 

 automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE.  We disagree. 
 
Rule 609(a), SCRE, provides: 
 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,  
 
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted 
of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the 
law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 
accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the 
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
 
In State v. Al-Amin, the court of appeals considered the question of whether 
the appellant was entitled to a new trial after the trial court admitted his prior 
armed robbery conviction without first weighing the probative value and 
prejudicial effects of the admission.  353 S.C. at 408–09, 414, 578 S.E.2d at 34, 37. 
Noting that "[t]here is disagreement among federal circuit courts and state courts 
construing Rule 609(a)(2) as to which crimes are included," the court of appeals 
explained that "[t]he disagreement revolves around whether convictions for theft 
crimes, such as larceny, robbery, and shoplifting, should be admitted under the rule 
as involving dishonesty or false statement."  Id. at 415, 578 S.E.2d at 37.  The 
court of appeals acknowledged that a majority of federal courts has adopted a 
narrow approach to the question, but declined to follow federal precedent, instead 
adopting an expansive approach to determining what constitutes a "crime of 
dishonesty or false statement." Id. at 416, 578 S.E.2d at 38. The court of appeals 
reasoned: 
 
"An essential element of robbery is that the perpetrator of the offense 
steals the goods and chattels of another or, in the case of an attempt to 
commit robbery, intends to steal the goods or chattels of the person 
assaulted. If this element is not present, the crime is not robbery or an 
attempted robbery. Stealing is defined in law as larceny. Larceny 
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involves dishonesty. The fact that the perpetrator of the crime 
manifests or declares his dishonesty by brazenly committing the crime 
does not make him an honest person."  
Id. at 421, 578 S.E.2d at 40–41 (quoting State v. Goad, 692 S.W.2d 32, 37 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1985)).  Thus, the court of appeals concluded, "It is the larcenous 
element of taking property of another which makes the action dishonest. Larceny is 
a lesser-included offense of armed robbery." Id. at 425, 578 S.E.2d at 43 (citations 
omitted).  The court of appeals, citing several dictionary definitions, found further,  
To restrict the application of Rule 609(a)(2) only to those offenses 
which evidence an element of affirmative misstatement or 
misrepresentation of fact would be to ignore the plain meaning of the 
word "dishonesty." "Dishonesty" is, by definition, a "'disposition to 
lie, cheat, or steal.'" "To be dishonest means to deceive, defraud or 
steal." "'In common human experience[,] acts of deceit, fraud, 
cheating, or stealing . . . are universally regarded as conduct which 
reflects adversely on a man's honesty and integrity.'" 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
More recently, however, we decided State v. Bryant, in which we held that 
the trial court erroneously admitted the petitioner's prior firearms convictions under 
Rule 609 without weighing the probative value and prejudicial effects of their 
admission because the firearms offenses were not crimes involving dishonesty.  
369 S.C. 511, 517, 633 S.E.2d 152, 155–56 (2006).  In so holding, we stated: 
Violations of narcotics laws are generally not probative of 
truthfulness. See State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526, 552 S.E.2d 300 
(2001) (citing State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000)). 
Furthermore, a conviction for robbery, burglary, theft, and drug 
possession, beyond the basic crime itself, is not probative of 
truthfulness. United States v. Smith, 181 F. Supp. 2d 904 (N.D. Ill. 
2002).[5] Likewise, firearms violations also are not generally probative 
5 In Smith, the court stated: 
[E]vidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime involving 
17 

 of truthfulness. Accordingly, Petitioner's prior firearms convictions do 
not involve dishonesty and their probative value should have been 
weighed against their prejudicial effect prior to their admission 
pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1). 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
Here, the State argues that because Bryant involved convictions for firearms 
offenses, and not explicitly a prior armed robbery conviction, the above language 
is merely dicta. Therefore, the State relies on earlier precedents from our courts— 
namely Al-Amin—and points to other states' precedents to support its argument that 
armed robbery is a crime of dishonesty, such that no balancing test is required.   
 
 We take this opportunity to overrule Al-Amin, and reaffirm the rule as 
formulated in Bryant that armed robbery is not a crime of dishonesty or false 
statement for purposes of impeachment under Rule 609(a)(2).  While many states 
have adopted a broader interpretation of the Rule, we find the analysis to be more 
nuanced than that undertaken by the Al-Amin court.6  Under Al-Amin's and the 
                                                                                                                             
dishonesty or false statement is admissible without regard to its 
prejudicial effect. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). Smith's forgery conviction 
is admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). However, his convictions for 
robbery, burglary, theft, and drug possession convictions are not, as 
the government has not shown that any of them involved false 
statements or acts of deceit beyond the basic crime itself, and as to the 
theft convictions has not shown that it involved items of significant 
value. 
 
181 F. Supp. 2d at 909 (internal citations omitted). 
 
6  See Stuart P. Green,  Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of 
Evidence 609(a)(2) and the Origins of Crimen Falsi, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
1087, 1119 (2000) ("The problem with [a broad reading of the term 'crime of 
dishonesty'] . . . is that it blurs the moral distinction between stealing and lying. A 
person who steals is certainly dishonest; she rejects the idea of making an honest 
living; she cheats; she takes something to which she is not entitled; she disobeys 
the rules. But there is no particular reason to think that she is deceitful. Indeed, 
what little empirical evidence there is indicates that a prior conviction for larceny 
18 

  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
concurrence's rationale, the exception contained in Rule 609(a)(2), which permits 
the automatic admission of certain prior convictions, swallows the rule contained 
in Rule 609(a)(1), in which discretion regarding the admission of prior convictions 
rests with the trial judge. We think this interpretation is contrary to the intent of 
the Rule. 
Thus, we hold that for impeachment purposes, crimes of "dishonesty or false 
statement" are crimes in the nature of crimen falsi "that bear upon a witness's 
propensity to testify truthfully." Adams v. State, 644 S.E.2d 426, 431–32 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2007) (footnote omitted) (surveying federal and state treatment of the issue, 
and adopting the more narrow federal definition); see also United States v. Smith,
551 F.2d 348, 362–63 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[I]n its broadest sense, the term 'crimen 
falsi' has encompassed only those crimes characterized by an element of deceit or 
deliberate interference with a court's ascertainment of truth." (emphasis added)). 
Armed robbery, therefore, is not per se probative of truthfulness.
The Federal Rules of Evidence specifically identify crimena falsi in Rule 
609(a)(2), FRE, as crimes which by their very nature permit the impeachment of a 
witness convicted of a crime of "dishonesty or false statement." Green, supra note 
6, at 1090. In fact, 
[t]he original Conference Report makes the link between Rule 
609(a)(2) and the crimena falsi explicit, defining the phrase "crimes 
involving dishonesty or false statement" as "crimes such as perjury, 
subornation of perjury, false statements, criminal fraud, 
embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of 
crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of 
deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused's 
propensity to testify truthfully."
Id. at 1090–91 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
93-1037, at 9 (1975)). While the State emphasizes that South Carolina did not 
adopt this explanatory language when it adopted Federal Rule 609, the notion of 
crimen falsi in the evidentiary context is long-established in the common law of 
South Carolina. See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 35 S.C. 279, 282, 14 S.E. 617, 618 
(stealing by stealth) says little or nothing about a witness'[s] propensity to lie." 
(footnote omitted)). 
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(1892) ("The old, well-settled rule was that one who had been convicted of a crime 
belonging to the class known as the 'crimen falsi' was said to be infamous, and 
incompetent to testify.").  Thus, the State's argument is unavailing.  Cf. Williams v. 
Condon, 347 S.C. 227, 247, 553 S.E.2d 496, 507 (Ct. App. 2001) ("A strong 
presumption . . . exists that the General Assembly does not intend to supplant 
common law principles when enacting legislation." (citations omitted)).7 
Here, the trial judge felt constrained by Al-Amin to forgo a balancing test, 
even though he noted that Al-Amin was a "significant departure" from what he 
understood the law to be, especially because the State sought to admit three prior 
convictions identical to the one for which Respondent was currently on trial.  We 
agree with the trial judge that the prejudicial effect of admitting prior convictions 
for the exact same offense is often very high. See State v. Scriven, 339 S.C. 333, 
343–44, 529 S.E.2d 71, 76–77 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that because the prior 
convictions were "similar or identical to charged offenses, . . . the likelihood of a 
high degree of prejudice to the accused [was] inescapable").  For this reason, a rule 
that places discretion with the trial judge is even more desirable, and unlike the 
concurrence, we think the trial judge is the best arbiter of whether a very 
prejudicial piece of evidence should be admitted in this situation—unless of course 
the prior crime specifically relates to a defendant's penchant to tell the truth on the 
witness stand. Importantly, our holding today does not preclude the admission of 
prior convictions for armed robbery; rather, it merely enables a trial judge to 
conduct a balancing test pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1) when the State seeks prior 
convictions for armed robbery to impeach a criminal defendant's testimony.
Ultimately, the Rule is designed to help the jury discern the truth.  It is not a 
tool for the State to bolster its case against the criminal defendant for the mere fact 
7 While the concurrence criticizes our reliance on the federal interpretation of the 
Rules, we note that we routinely look to the federal interpretation of the Rules of 
Evidence to guide us in our interpretation of our own Rules of Evidence.  See, e.g., 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 405 S.C. 584, 594, 748 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2013) 
("Because our appellate courts have not definitively addressed Rule 60(b)(5), we 
have looked to the federal courts' interpretation as our rule is similar to the federal 
rule."); Laffitte v. Bridgestone Corp., 381 S.C. 460, 474 n.10, 674 S.E.2d 154, 162 
n.10 (2009) ("The language of Rule 26(c), SCRCP, mirrors that of federal Rule 
26(c). Because there is no South Carolina precedent construing this rule, federal 
interpretation of Rule 26(c) is persuasive authority." (citation omitted)). 
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that the defendant has engaged in prior criminal activity.  The balance we strike 
today cuts to the heart of our system's conceptions of fair trial and fair play.      
Thus, we affirm the court of appeals' finding that armed robbery is not a 
crime of "dishonesty or false statement," rendering it admissible pursuant to Rule 
609(a)(2), SCRE. 
II. Harmless Error 
Next, the State argues that any error in admitting the prior armed robbery 
convictions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  We agree. 
While we agree with the court of appeals that in many instances, the 
admission of identical prior convictions for impeachment purposes enhances its 
prejudicial nature, it does not conclusively render the error so prejudicial that it is 
not subject to a harmless error analysis. Rather,  
[w]hether the improper introduction of this evidence is harmless 
requires us to look at the other evidence admitted at trial to determine 
whether the defendant's "guilt is conclusively proven by competent 
evidence, such that no other rational conclusion could be reached."  
State v. Brooks, 341 S.C. 57, 62–63, 533 S.E.2d 325, 328 (2000) (quoting State v.
Parker, 315 S.C. 230, 234, 433 S.E.2d 831, 833 (1993)).  
Here, the other evidence implicating Respondent in these crimes was 
overwhelming.  Respondent was positively identified by several employees who 
recalled Respondent's distinctive facial features and clothing.  Furthermore, one of 
the employees watched as Respondent's accomplice drove him away from the 
scene in a dented gray truck, which the police stopped a only a short distance away 
within minutes after the employees reported the robbery.  Inside the getaway 
vehicle, police found Respondent crouching in the floorboard area, sitting adjacent 
to a gun and a bag of money matching the employees' descriptions.   
Therefore, in spite of the error in admitting Respondent's prior convictions 
for armed robbery, we find such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and we reverse the part of the court of appeals' decision finding otherwise.  See,
e.g., State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 334, 563 S.E.2d 315, 319 (2002) ("'Harmless 
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beyond a reasonable doubt' means the reviewing court can conclude the error did 
not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.").8 
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is 
REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART. 
KITTREDGE and BEATTY, JJ., concur.  HEARN, J., concurring in a 
separate opinion in which PLEICONES, J., concurs. 
8 The State also contends that the court of appeals erred in refusing to remand the 
case to the trial court, and in conducting the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test itself.  
Our harmless error analysis renders the remand issue moot.
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 JUSTICE HEARN: I concur in the result reached by the majority.  
However, I would reverse the court of appeals' opinion and hold the trial 
court did not err in admitting Broadnax's prior convictions because armed 
robbery is a crime involving dishonesty under Rule 609(a)(2) of the South 
Carolina Rules of Evidence. 
I appreciate the majority's discussion of the similar federal rule and its 
accompanying legislative history. As the majority correctly asserts, the 
federal rule has been interpreted to limit the application of Rule 609(a)(2), 
FRE to those prior convictions of crimes whose central elements involve 
crimen falsi. See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362–63 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) ("[I]n its broadest sense, the term 'crimen falsi' has encompassed only 
those crimes characterized by an element of deceit or deliberate interference 
with a court's ascertainment of truth.").  
However, the majority's analysis ignores that neither our rule nor its 
commentary, both of which were promulgated by this Court, contain any 
reference to crimen falsi. Cf. Rule 609 note ("Subsection (a) does change the 
law in South Carolina."). Further, I disagree with the majority that the 
common law somehow contains and thus preserves the concept that crimen 
falsi is the operative standard.  Curiously, the sole case the majority cites to 
support this proposition, State v. Peterson, 35 S.C. 279, 14 S.E. 617 (1892), 
affirmed the trial court's admission of a prior conviction for the exact crime at 
issue today: robbery. Id. at 281, 14 S.E. at 618.  
Accordingly, this Court's interpretation of Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE must 
be limited to its plain language. The Rule states: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,  
 
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted 
of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the 
law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 
accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the 
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
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(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
Rule 609(a), SCRE (emphasis added). As our court of appeals succinctly 
noted in State v. Al–Amin, 353 S.C. 405, 578 S.E.2d 32 (Ct. App. 2003), the 
operative word for this analysis is "dishonesty."  As elucidated by that court: 
To restrict the application of Rule 609(a)(2) only to those 
offenses which evidence an element of affirmative misstatement 
or misrepresentation of fact would be to ignore the plain meaning 
of the word "dishonesty." "Dishonesty" is, by definition, a 
"'disposition to lie, cheat, or steal.'" "To be dishonest means to 
deceive, defraud or steal." "'In common human experience[,] acts 
of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing . . . are universally regarded 
as conduct which reflects adversely on a man's honesty and 
integrity.'"  
Id. at 425, 578 S.E.2d at 43 (internal citations omitted).  Restricting our 
analysis—as we must—to the plain language of 609(a)(2), SCRE there is no 
doubt armed robbery constitutes a crime involving dishonesty. Stealing, even 
more so when done at gunpoint, is essentially the type of behavior reflecting 
adversely on one's character for truthfulness envisioned by Rule 609(a)(2). 
Holding that armed robbery is a crime of dishonesty pursuant to Rule 
609(a)(2) would avoid the perverse result the majority creates, where 
shoplifting is a crime of dishonesty pursuant to State v. Johnson, 334 S.C. 78, 
87, 512 S.E.2d 795, 800 (1999), but armed robbery is not.9  Further, it 
                                        
 
 
9 I do not believe the result in this case is dictated by stare decisis.  As the majority 
points out, the Court's decision in State v. Bryant, 369 S.C. 511, 517, 633 S.E.2d 
152, 155–56 (2006), dealt only with the question of whether prior firearm 
convictions involve dishonesty. Thus, the Court was not required to reach the 
same issue that is before us today.  See generally State v. Austin, 306 S.C. 9, 19, 
409 S.E.2d 811, 817 (Ct. App. 1991) (Sanders, C.J.) ("[A]ppellate courts in this 
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comports with the outcome a majority of states have reached on the same 
issue. See Jane M. Draper, Annotation, What Constitutes Crime Involving 
“Dishonesty or False Statement” Under Rule 609(a)(2) of Uniform Rules of 
Evidence or Similar State Rule—Crimes Involving Violence or Potential for 
Violence, 83 A.L.R. 277 (2000) (compiling decisions from other 
jurisdictions); see, e.g., Alexander v. State, 611 P.2d 469, 476 n.18 (Alaska 
1980) ("It is the larceny element of robbery which makes such a conviction 
admissible as impeachment of a witness.").
Accordingly, I would hold the trial court did not err by allowing in 
evidence of Broadnax's prior convictions pursuant to 609(a)(2) because 
armed robbery is a crime involving dishonesty, and would reverse the 
contrary decision of the court of appeals. 
PLEICONES, J., concurs.
state, like well-behaved children, do not speak unless spoken to and do not answer 
questions they are not asked.").
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Fred W. Auman, III, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001442 
Opinion No. 27549 

Submitted July 9, 2015 – Filed July 23, 2015 

DISBARRED 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Barbara 
M. Seymour, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
J. Steedley Bogan, Esquire, of Bogan Law Firm and John 
S. Nichols, Esquire, of Bluestein Nichols Thompson & 
Delgado, LLC, both of Columbia, for Respondent. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
disbarment.  Respondent requests the disbarment be made retroactive to February 
26, 2015, the date he was suspended and transferred to incapacity inactive status.1 
We accept the Agreement and disbar respondent from the practice of law in this 
state, with conditions that will be set forth more fully below.  The disbarment shall 
be retroactive to the date respondent was placed on interim suspension and 
transferred to incapacity inactive status.  The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, 
are as follows. 
1 See In re Auman, 411 S.C. 464, 769 S.E.2d (2015). 
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Facts 
On February 12, 2013, a trust account check in the amount of $2,500 issued by 
respondent was presented to the bank. The check was paid by the bank despite 
there being insufficient funds in the account, resulting in an overdraft of $1,453.75.  
The lack of sufficient funds was caused by respondent's overpayment on a 
settlement he disbursed in October 2012.
On October 10, 2012, respondent deposited into his trust account a settlement of 
$25,000 obtained on behalf of a personal injury client.  On October 12, 2012, 
respondent issued a check payable to his law firm's operating account in the 
amount of $4,000 for his portion of the fees.  Respondent failed to inform his 
bookkeeper he issued the fee check. 
On October 17, 2012, the client came to the office to sign the disbursement 
statement and receive her funds. Because the staff was unaware respondent had 
already written his own fee check, a second fee check was deposited into the law 
firm's operating account.  Despite the overpayment of funds disbursed on behalf of 
the client, the trust account was not overdrawn until February 2013.  The reason 
for the delay was that a check disbursed to a third party on behalf of the client was 
not negotiated until February. The delay created a "float" that kept the balance in 
the trust account above zero until the check was presented. 
Respondent acknowledges his failure to obtain the client's consent to the 
disbursement of funds on his behalf prior to negotiating his fee check violated Rule 
1.5(c), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR.2  He further acknowledges his failure to discover 
the overpayment of funds on behalf of the client resulted from his lack of adequate 
management of his trust account and his failure to conduct required monthly 
reconciliations.
2 Rule 1.5(c) states: "A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service 
is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other 
law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall state the 
method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall 
accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be 
deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the 
contingent fee is calculated.  The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses the 
client will be expected to pay. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall 
provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a 
recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination." 
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 Indeed, during the course of its investigation, ODC's review of respondent's 
financial records revealed the following violations of Rule 1.15(c), RPC, and Rule 
417, SCACR: 
1. Respondent did not conduct monthly three-part 
reconciliations of his trust account.  The two-part 
reconciliations that his staff did produce showed a 
negative journal balance month after month, but 
respondent took no action to determine the cause or 
rectify the problem. 
 
2. Respondent did not maintain complete copies of 
records of trust account deposits or cancelled trust 
account checks. 
 
3. Respondent did not maintain complete client ledgers. 
Between December 2010 and March 2013, respondent made approximately forty 
withdrawals from his trust account, by checks payable to his law firm and 
electronic funds transfers to his law firm operating account, that were not earned 
fees. Respondent used the funds improperly removed from the trust account for 
office expenses, advanced costs for clients, payroll, and taxes.  The total amount 
removed by respondent from the trust account for these improper purposes was 
approximately $270,250.  At the time of his interim suspension, respondent should 
have had approximately $225,367.96 in trust for thirty-five clients.  In addition, 
respondent had issued checks totaling approximately $39,085.87 that had not yet 
cleared the trust account.  The balance in respondent's trust account at the time 
totaled approximately $53,649.30. 
Law 
Respondent's admits the misappropriation of funds from his trust account violated 
the following Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.15(d)("Upon receiving funds 
or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall 
promptly notify the client or third person.  Except as stated in this rule or otherwise 
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver 
to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third 
person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall 
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promptly render a full accounting regarding such property."); Rule 1.15(g)("A 
lawyer shall not use or pledge any entrusted property to obtain credit or other 
personal benefit for the lawyer or any person other than the legal or beneficial 
owner of that property."); Rule 8.4(b)(It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.); and Rule 8.4(d)(It is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.).  Respondent also admits the allegations 
constitute grounds for discipline under Rule 7(a)(1), RLDE (It shall be a ground 
for discipline for a lawyer to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.).  Finally, 
respondent admits his conduct violates Rule 417, SCACR (financial 
recordkeeping). 
Conclusion 
 
In addition to consenting to disbarment, respondent has agreed to the following 
conditions: 
1. Within two years of the date of the Court's opinion 
imposing a sanction, respondent will pay restitution in 
full to a list of clients in the Agreement pursuant to a 
payment plan approved by the Commission on 
Lawyer Conduct, or provide proof satisfactory to the 
Commission that the amount specified as owed to an 
affected individual or entity has otherwise been 
satisfied.3  This restitution totals $241,399.61. 
 
2. Within three years of the date of the Court's opinion 
imposing a sanction, respondent will pay the costs 
incurred in the investigation of this matter by ODC, 
pursuant to a payment plan approved by the 
3 The Agreement notes the Receiver currently holds some funds in trust.  In addition, there are 
claims pending with the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection.  The Agreement states respondent's
restitution obligation to any listed individual or entity will be reduced by the Commission 
proportionate to any funds paid to that individual or entity from either of these two sources. 
29 

                                         
Commission on Lawyer Conduct.4  
3. Within three years of the date of the Court's opinion 
imposing a sanction, respondent will reimburse the 
Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for all claims 
paid to clients on respondent's behalf, pursuant to a 
payment plan approved by the Commission on 
Lawyer Conduct.5  
 
Finally, respondent has agreed that in addition to the requirements of Rule 30, 
RLDE, he will not be eligible for readmission until he completes the Bar's Legal 
Ethics and Practice Program's Law Office Management School and Trust Account 
School. 
 
We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and disbar respondent from 
the practice of law in this state, retroactive to February 26, 2015.  He shall also 
comply with the conditions set forth in the preceding paragraphs.  Within fifteen 
(15) days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file an affidavit with the 
Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30 of Rule 413, SCACR, 
and shall also surrender his Certificate of Admission to the Practice of Law to the 
Clerk of Court. 
 
DISBARRED. 
 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, and HEARN, JJ., concur. 
KITTREDGE, J., not participating. 
 
4 The Agreement notes this obligation is separate and apart from any obligation to reimburse the 
Commission for the Receiver's expenses.  The Agreement states respondent's obligation to pay 
for the Receiver will be determined by the Court at the time of the termination of the Receiver's 
appointment. 
5 The Agreement notes this obligation is separate and apart from any obligation to reimburse the 
Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for the Receiver's expenses.  The Agreement states that if 
the Court orders the Lawyers' Fund to pay Receiver expenses, respondent's obligation to 
reimburse the Lawyers' Fund will be determined by the Court at the time of the termination of 
the Receiver's appointment. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Sara Jayne Rogers, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001444 
Opinion No. 27550 

Submitted July 9, 2015 – Filed July 23, 2015 

DISBARRED 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Sabrina 
C. Todd, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Sara Jayne Rogers, Respondent, Pro Se. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
disbarment.  We accept the Agreement and disbar respondent from the practice of 
law in this state, with conditions that will be set forth more fully below.  The facts, 
as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows. 
Facts 
Matter I
Respondent negotiated a plea agreement on behalf of a client which required the 
client to pay restitution, prosecution costs, and other fines and fees.  Sufficient 
funds had to be deposited into respondent's trust account before the client could 
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plead guilty. The client provided respondent with a total of $157,500, in addition 
to respondent's fee.  The client pled guilty and after all items were paid, $22,795 of 
the client's funds remained in respondent's trust account.  Respondent did not 
return the funds to the client and made no further payments on the client's behalf, 
but failed to keep the client's remaining funds safe.  The balance in respondent's
trust account fell below $22,795 within three weeks and below $100 within a year.  
Respondent wrote to ODC before a complaint was filed, describing the matter as a 
fee dispute. However, by that time, respondent had admitted to the client that she 
did not have the balance of his money.  The client filed a claim with the Lawyers'
Fund for Client Protection and received an award of $22,795.
During the investigation of the matter, ODC subpoenaed respondent for her trust 
account records. In response, respondent provided a partial bank statement and 
copies of a few checks related to the client's case.  Respondent did not provide any 
other trust account records despite repeated requests.  Respondent did not keep a 
receipt and disbursement journal or client ledgers for her trust account and did not 
maintain a running balance.  She never attempted to reconcile the account.  Indeed, 
respondent did not have the knowledge and skills necessary to keep and balance a 
simple checkbook and made no effort to learn how to properly protect the funds 
entrusted to her care.   
A review of the records provided by respondent's bank revealed that during a 
period of approximately two years, respondent deposited approximately $7,800 in 
unidentified funds into her trust account.  During that same period of time, she 
disbursed more than $26,000 in funds without specifically identifying the client or 
matter involved, including nearly $25,000 in checks made payable to her.  
Respondent also issued checks to herself for fees and to others for costs in cases 
for which the records show no identifiable deposit.  Respondent further made two 
cash withdrawals from her trust account totaling $901.27 and paid her CLE 
reporting fee and late fee with a trust account check. 
By failing to return the client's funds to him and failing to keep those funds and 
other funds entrusted to her safe, respondent violated Rule 1.15, RPC (safekeeping 
property).  She also violated Rule 1.15 and Rule 417, SCACR (financial 
recordkeeping), by failing to create and maintain the records required by Rule 417.  
Finally, by initially describing the matter to ODC as a fee dispute, respondent 
knowingly made a false statement of material fact in violation of Rule 8.1(b), RPC 
(a lawyer, in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not fail to disclose a fact 
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necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the lawyer to have arisen in the 
matter) and Rule 417. 
Matter II 
Respondent accepted two checks, totaling $5,000, from a client for future fees and 
expenses. Respondent cashed the checks rather than deposit them into her trust 
account as the fee agreement indicated would occur.  Despite not having funds for 
the client in her trust account, respondent issued several checks to herself and 
others from the account, noting the payments were related to the client's case.  The 
client terminated respondent because she was not communicating with him and the 
case was not making progress.  Respondent did not surrender the file to the client 
until 52 days after the client's new attorney requested it.  When the client finally 
received the file, he learned for the first time that a temporary hearing had been 
scheduled and continued at least six times in his case.  Respondent also failed to 
provide the client an accounting of his funds despite numerous requests and failed 
to honor her repeated promises for a refund.  Respondent, on several occasions, 
claimed she had mailed a refund check when she had not done so.  The Lawyers'
Fund for Client Protection approved a $5,000 award for the client.  Respondent 
failed to respond to the Notice of Investigation into the client's complaint.   
Respondent failed to keep the client informed about the status of his case in 
violation of Rule 1.4, RPC (communication with the client).  Respondent violated 
Rule 1.15, RPC, by failing to deposit the client's funds into respondent's trust 
account, making disbursements from the trust account when the client had no funds 
on deposit, and failing to provide an accounting of the client's funds upon request.  
Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d), RPC (upon termination of representation, a 
lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's
interests, such as surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled 
and refunding any advance payment of fees or expenses that has not been earned or 
incurred), when she failed to timely surrender the client's file and return unearned 
fees. By falsely claiming she had mailed refund checks, respondent violated Rule 
8.4(d), RPC (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation).  Finally, by failing to 
respond to the Notice of Investigation, respondent violated Rule 8.1(b), RPC. 
Matter III 
Respondent accepted a total of $6,000 to represent a client, but did not deposit any 
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of the funds into her trust account even though the funds were unearned upon 
receipt. Respondent failed to adequately explain a procedural matter to the client, 
leaving him confused about the status of his case.  Additionally, on more than one 
occasion, respondent told the client she was drafting emergency motions that she 
never completed or filed.  One of those instances occurred after respondent was 
placed on interim suspension.  Respondent did not tell the client she was
suspended. Over the next two weeks, respondent failed to respond to the client.  
When she ultimately responded, respondent claimed she filed the motion and 
should hear something soon.  No motion was filed and the client thereafter learned 
of respondent's suspension.  Respondent failed to return unearned fees to the client.  
The client filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection and received 
an award of $2,251.97. Respondent failed to cooperate with ODC's investigation 
into the matter. 
Respondent violated Rule 1.4, RPC, by failing to adequately advise the client of 
the status of his matter.  She violated Rule 1.15, RPC, by failing to deposit 
unearned fees into her trust account. By offering to file a motion when she was not 
authorized to practice law and later advising the client the motion was filed, 
respondent violated Rules 5.5 (a lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this 
jurisdiction shall not represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this 
jurisdiction), 8.4(d) and 8.4(e) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage 
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), RPC. 
Matter IV 
Respondent failed to cooperate in ODC's investigation of a complaint received 
from another client.  Although the investigation did not reveal clear and convincing 
evidence of misconduct, respondent violated Rule 8.1(b), RPC, by failing to 
cooperate. 
Law 
Respondent admits she has violated the provisions of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct set forth above, as well as Rule 417, SCACR.  She further admits those 
violations and the allegations upon which they are based constitute grounds for 
discipline under Rule 7(a)(1) and (5), RLDE (it shall be a ground for discipline for 
a lawyer to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or any other rules of this 
jurisdiction regarding professional conduct of lawyers or to engage in conduct 
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tending to pollute the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal 
profession into disrepute or conduct demonstrating an unfitness to practice law). 
Conclusion 
In addition to consenting to disbarment, respondent has agreed to, within thirty 
days of imposition of discipline, enter into a restitution plan with the Commission 
on Lawyer Conduct to fully reimburse the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for 
all disbursements made on her behalf and to pay the costs incurred in the 
investigation and prosecution of this matter by ODC and the Commission.  
Respondent further agrees to complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program 
Ethics School, Trust Account School, and Advertising School prior to seeking 
readmission.  Finally, respondent agrees she may not seek readmission until she 
has fully completed the terms of her restitution plan with the Commission. 
We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and disbar respondent from
the practice of law in this state. She shall also comply with the conditions set forth 
in the preceding paragraph. Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, 
respondent shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that she has 
complied with Rule 30 of Rule 413, SCACR, and shall also surrender her 
Certificate of Admission to the Practice of Law to the Clerk of Court. 
DISBARRED. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, and HEARN, JJ., concur. 
KITTREDGE, J., not participating. 
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AFFIRMED 
Attorney General Alan M. Wilson and Senior Assistant 
Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of Columbia, 
for Petitioner. 
Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for 
Respondent. 
JUSTICE HEARN: Gerald Smith was indicted for murder and pled guilty
to voluntary manslaughter in the killing of his oxycontin supplier.  He was 
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sentenced to twenty-four years' imprisonment after the State requested he receive 
the maximum punishment.  In this post-conviction relief (PCR) action, Smith 
alleges his attorney was deficient for failing to object to the State's 
recommendation after the State had previously promised to remain silent during 
sentencing.  The PCR court denied Smith's application and the court of appeals 
reversed. Smith v. State, 407 S.C. 270, 754 S.E.2d 900 (Ct. App. 2014).
We agree with the court of appeals' excellent analysis that the State's
recommendation of the maximum sentence was a breach of its agreement with 
Smith even where the State did not get the expected benefit of its bargain, and that 
Smith would not have pled guilty had he known the solicitor was going to breach
the agreement; therefore, plea counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See Thompson v. State, 340 S.C. 112, 531 S.E.2d 294 
(2000) (holding counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the solicitor 
recommended the trial judge impose the maximum sentence in contravention of its 
agreement to stay silent); Jordan v. State, 297 S.C. 52, 374 S.E.2d 683 (1988) 
(same). 
We take this opportunity to explain the proper remedy under these 
circumstances.  In Jordan, the Court reversed the PCR court's denial of relief and 
remanded for either a new trial or resentencing.  Id. at 52, 374 S.E.2d at 684. In 
Thompson, the Court reversed the PCR court's denial of relief, and remanded 
solely for resentencing. 340 S.C. at 118, 531 S.E.2d at 297.  Here, presumably 
following the precedent of Thompson, the court of appeals reversed and remanded 
for resentencing. We now clarify the proper remedy is a new trial.1  Although 
Smith's attorney was deficient for failing to object at the sentencing hearing, the 
underlying question is whether Smith would have entered into the plea agreement 
had he known the State was going to breach the agreement.  See Jordan, 297 S.C. 
at 54, 374 S.E.2d at 684 (stating a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel during a guilty plea must show "there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial") (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Therefore, the 
proper remedy for counsel's ineffective assistance is invalidation of the entire 
agreement.
1 We note that Smith requested only a new trial—not resentencing—during his 
PCR hearing. 
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Nevertheless, we affirm the court of appeals' decision reversing and 
remanding for resentencing because neither party appealed from the mandate 
portion of the decision.  The court of appeals' unappealed remand for resentencing
is thus the law of the case.  See Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 
398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012) ("[A]n unappealed ruling, right or 
wrong, is the law of the case.").  Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals in toto. 
TOAL, C.J., KITTREDGE, J., and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur.  
PLEICONES, J., concurring in result only. 
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JUSTICE PLEICONES:  Petitioners Julia Gorman and Robert Palmer were tried 
jointly for the death of Gorman's seventeen month-old grandson (victim).  Palmer 
and Gorman, who lived together but were not married, were each convicted of 
homicide by child abuse (homicide), aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse 
(aiding and abetting), and unlawful conduct towards a child (unlawful conduct).  
On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed both Palmer's and Gorman's aiding 
and abetting convictions, and a majority affirmed both petitioners' homicide and 
unlawful conduct convictions. State v. Palmer, 408 S.C. 218, 758 S.E.2d 195 (Ct. 
App. 2014). Judge Pieper dissented, and would have reversed all of the petitioners'
convictions on the ground "the State did not present any direct or circumstantial 
evidence to reasonably prove which codefendant harmed the child."  We granted 
both petitioners' and the State's petitions for writs of certiorari to review the 
directed verdict issues.1  We affirm the Court of Appeals' reversal of both aiding 
and abetting convictions, and affirm the decision to uphold the denial of Gorman's
homicide and unlawful conduct directed verdict motions.  We reverse the Court of 
Appeals' affirmance of Palmer's convictions for homicide and unlawful conduct 
finding he was entitled to a directed verdict on both charges.  
1 While we also granted Palmer's petition to review a proffer issue, Palmer did not 
brief the proffer issue on certiorari and it is therefore deemed abandoned.  See Rule 
208(b)(1)(D), SCACR; see also Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 640 S.E.2d 486 (Ct. 
App. 2006). 
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FACTS
 
The only contested issues here are the identity of the individual who harmed the 
victim and whether the other individual was aware of the abuse.  Since this matter 
involves directed verdict questions, we begin with a review of the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State.  E.g. State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 555 S.E.2d 
402 (2001). In our review we rely solely on evidence from the State's case-in-chief 
in order to avoid any of the directed verdict issues that can arise when jointly tried 
codefendants blame each other in their defense cases.  See State v. Hepburn, 406 
S.C. 416, 753 S.E.2d 402 (2013) (waiver rule bars consideration of codefendant's
testimony in reviewing denial of mid-trial directed verdict motion).  Here, Gorman 
testified in her own defense and stated that Palmer was alone with the victim 
during the time when the fatal injury must have been inflicted.  We do not rely on 
her trial testimony because it cannot be used against Palmer, and because no 
evidence adduced in the defense cases are necessary to a determination whether 
Gorman's directed verdict motions were properly denied. 
The evidence shows Gorman's eighteen year-old daughter Cesalee traveled by bus 
to South Carolina with her child, the victim, in late June 2008.  Cesalee and her 
mother had a difficult relationship and had long been estranged.  On July 2, 
Cesalee flew back to her home in Arizona, leaving the victim in the petitioners'
care. While there was overwhelming evidence that Gorman agreed to keep the 
victim while Cesalee packed her family's belongings for a move to the East Coast, 
Gorman told several people after the victim's injuries that Cesalee had abandoned 
the victim to her. 
On July 1, the victim was taken to the doctor's office by Cesalee and Gorman, 
suffering from ant bites and allergies.  He was prescribed a cream for the bites and 
a liquid antihistamine (Xyzal) for his allergies.  The prescribed dosage for the 
Xyzal, which has a sedative effect, was 0.5 teaspoon per day.  An appointment was 
set for July 8 so that he could receive immunizations.  On July 7, after Cesalee had 
returned to Arizona, Gorman took the victim to the emergency room reporting he 
was suffering from projectile vomiting.  The victim was observed, given a 
Pedialyte popsicle, and released. 
When Gorman brought the victim back to the family practitioner on July 8, the 
office was aware of the emergency room visit the night before.  The family 
practitioner examined the victim, determined he had recovered from the bites, the 
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allergies, and the nausea, and administered the vaccinations.  She testified that she 
had examined the victim's head as part of the check-up and had no concerns, and 
also that while the victim was small for his age he was not malnourished.  The 
doctor also testified she had no concerns about child abuse when she saw the 
victim in July.
Gorman repeatedly told medical personnel the victim was lethargic, and Palmer's 
statements also indicated the victim was not an energetic toddler.  There was 
evidence from which a jury could find the victim's lethargy after July 1, when he 
was prescribed the sedating Xyzal, was attributable to Gorman's overdosing.  At 
the emergency room visit on July 7, Gorman told medical personnel the victim was 
being given 1.5 teaspoons of Xyzal per day rather than the 0.5 teaspoons he had 
been prescribed. After the victim was fatally injured on July 14, Gorman told an 
emergency room (ER) nurse that the victim had been on Xyzal, and that she had 
been administering a dose of 2.5 teaspoons, five times the prescribed amount.  In 
this statement, Gorman said the last dose had been given at 9:00 pm on July 11.  
On the other hand, while en route to the hospital on the 14th, Gorman told the 
EMT she had given the victim Xyzal on the 14th.  The family doctor testified that 
when she saw the victim on July 8, he was no longer in need of this antihistamine. 
On July 14, Gorman went to work, arriving at about 6:00 am, leaving Palmer alone 
with the sleeping victim.  There was evidence that the victim was tired all day, and 
somewhat whiney. He ate breakfast and lunch, but according to Palmer, having 
been awakened at about 9:30 am, the victim did not fall asleep again until about 3-
3:30 pm.  Gorman arrived home around 4:00 pm.  Gorman stated she went straight 
into the victim's room to check on him as she normally did when she first got 
home, and saw him sleeping soundly and breathing normally.  Later she and 
Palmer checked on him from the doorway.  Palmer agreed that they had checked 
on the sleeping victim from the doorway after Gorman arrived home, and that no 
one checked on him again until after they had eaten dinner around 6:00 pm.  Both 
petitioners maintained that after dinner Gorman returned to the bedroom alone, and 
she told officers she found the victim "slack," making "really strange noises," and 
with saliva at his mouth.  She picked him up, and brought him to Palmer.  Palmer 
said the victim was limp but seizing intermittently, with his fists balled up.  
Gorman agreed the victim was fine until she alone checked on him around 6:00 
pm.   
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Horry County Fire and Rescue were dispatched at 6:07 pm following a 9-1-1 call 
made by Gorman, and arrived at the home at 6:13 pm.  When they arrived, Palmer 
was holding the victim who was actively seizing and whose "pretty grave" 
condition was immediately apparent.  Petitioners told the responder the victim had 
not been sick and had been found in this condition during a nap.  The responder 
started an I.V. and gave oxygen, noting the victim was making unusual breathing 
sounds. EMS paramedics took over at 6:20 pm when the first responder brought 
the victim to their ambulance as it arrived.  The victim was still seizing and 
'posturing,' an involuntary movement where the limbs extend and retract that only 
occurs in intracranial injury cases.  He also exhibited a "right side gaze," with his 
eyes pointing towards the injured side of the brain.  His pupils were dilated but 
responded sluggishly and the seizures stopped as Valium was administered.   
The EMS medic testified Gorman rode in the front of the ambulance to the 
hospital.  Gorman said the victim had not been sick recently and had not fallen, but 
that she had given him a dose of Xyzal that day.  Gorman told her about the ant 
bites and stated the victim had been whiney and lethargic since then.  She also 
made a statement which the medic paraphrased as "She's raised several children in 
her lifetime and never seen such a bad one."  When the ambulance arrived at the 
hospital at about 7:00 pm, the victim was still posturing, his right-side gaze had not 
changed, his pupils were more dilated, he was still breathing very rapidly, and his 
heart rate was elevated.   
The ER nurse testified that on arrival the victim was unresponsive, posturing, 
seizing, and had dilated pupils. Gorman responded to the nurse's questions.  She 
said the victim had not fallen or hit his head on anything before the seizures 
started. She also told the ER nurse that he was on Xyzal, but she had not given 
him any since administering 2.5 teaspoon on July 11.  The nurse observed Palmer 
was very concerned and wanted to talk to and touch the seizing victim, in contrast 
to Gorman's behavior.   
The ER nurse testified that upon the victim's arrival at the Conway Hospital at 7:02 
pm  another nurse had scored the victim at a 5 on the Glasgow Coma Score.  At 
8:30 pm his score had dropped to a 3.  The scale runs from 15 to 3, and anything 
below a 9 is "gravely concerning." The victim's breathing was labored and 
grunting, and the nurse testified that human life cannot be maintained at that level 
of effort. His heart rate never dropped below 142, when a normal rate would have 
been 110 to 115. The ER nurse watched as the C.A.T. scan was performed, 
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immediately saw the skull fractures, and some bleeding at the back of the brain, 
and called the ER doctor. She testified the fractures and bleeding were consistent 
with violent trauma, and she also observed some abnormal bruising on the victim's
body. Palmer reported the victim had been dragging his foot earlier in the day.  
Gorman told the nurse the victim's mother was a drug addict who dropped the 
victim off and whose whereabouts were unknown.  The victim, who was very thin, 
remained at the Conway Hospital from 6:58 pm until he was helicoptered to the 
Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) in Charleston at 10:33 pm. 
The Conway ER doctor testified the victim arrived "in extremist [sic] immediately 
evident" "showing signs of a severe neurological injury."  The victim appeared to 
be breathing on his own but was posturing.  He was immediately intubated to 
maintain breathing. The C.A.T. scan showed severe trauma to the skull and brain 
such that "impending death is what it [sic] was concerned."  The brain had 
hemorrhages and edema and there was a loss of gray-white matter distinction 
indicating the death of brain tissue. 
The victim's father arrived in Charleston from Virginia on Monday, July 15, after 
Gorman called him during the evening of July 14 to say the victim was being 
airlifted to MUSC. After this conversation, the father called to speak to the doctor 
at the Conway Hospital, and based on that conversation, the father filed a police 
report. The father called Cesalee in Arizona but neither Palmer nor Gorman had 
tried to reach her. Cesalee flew to Charleston, and after consulting with the 
doctors who told them only machines were keeping the victim alive, the parents 
had him baptized and then donated his organs.  The victim was removed from life 
support on July 16.
A MUSC neuro-radiologist testified as an expert witness, having examined the 
medical reports and C.T. scans performed at Conway Hospital on July 14 and at 
MUSC on July 15. Those scans showed the victim suffered comminuted 
fractures,2 severe swelling of the brain, blood around the brain, and the loss of 
gray-white differentiation which indicates brain tissue has died.  The victim's skull 
fractures were the result of severe traumatic force of a type most commonly seen 
following an automobile accident.  The victim had no chance for a meaningful 
recovery. The bleeding was acute and the fractures showed no signs of healing.   
2 In a comminuted fracture the bone is broken into multiple pieces. 
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The neuro-radiologist testified a person suffering the type of injury inflicted upon 
the victim would be immediately severely symptomatic, exhibiting: 
 
(1) alteration or loss of consciousness; 
 
(2) alteration in breathing; 
 
(3) likely seizures; 
 
(4) inability to walk, move, or eat; 
 
(5) possible foaming at the mouth; and 
 
(6) no purposeful movement. 
 
The expert testified the severity of the fractures were of a type caused either by an 
automobile accident, by having been dropped from a two-story building, or from 
intentionally applied force. While she could not give an exact time, the onset of 
symptoms would have been very soon after the injury, if not immediate. 
 
The forensic pathologist autopsied the victim's body on July 19, 2008.  She found 
the head injuries were caused either by a single hit or compression, or possibly by 
one hit on each side of the victim's head. She testified the injury occurred between 
July 11 and July 14.3    
 
Finally, a MUSC doctor who serves as director of the Violence Intervention and 
Prevention Division in the pediatric department testified.  She observed the victim 
on July 15, finding him very thin, on a respirator, and totally unconscious with 
fixed and dilated pupils. In addition to the skull fractures, she found a number of 
unexplained/atypical bruises on the victim: one on his upper right thigh close to his 
buttocks; one close to his waist; and one on the inside of his leg.  The bruises could 
have been inflicted contemporaneously with the head injuries.  The head injuries 
had to have been inflicted on July 14, and it would have taken less than a minute to 
fracture the victim's skull.  Finally, this doctor opined that the injury must have 
been inflicted on the 14th as the victim would have died very soon after if not 
3 The State amended the indictments before trial to specify the fatal injury occurred 
on July 14. 
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placed on a respirator. She estimated the injuries were inflicted within three hours 
of his arrival at the Conway Hospital ER at 6:58 pm on July 14. 
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to reverse 
petitioners' convictions for homicide by child abuse and 
unlawful conduct towards a child, and in reversing the 
petitioners' convictions for aiding and abetting homicide by 
child abuse? 
ANALYSIS
In this case we are primarily concerned with whether the State presented any 
evidence of identity to support the submission of the three charges to the jury.  
Since the issues all involve a directed verdict, we review the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State.  State v. Buckmon, supra. We begin with the homicide 
by child abuse charges. 
A. Homicide by Child Abuse.
The application of the directed verdict standard in a circumstantial evidence case 
where one of two persons must have killed a child is set forth in State v. Hepburn, 
406 S.C. 416, 753 S.E.2d 402 (2013):
Homicide by child abuse cases are difficult to prove because 
often the only witnesses are the perpetrators of the crime. What 
separates this case from a case like Smith4 is that every piece of
the State's evidence establishes (1) Appellant was asleep at the 
time the victim sustained her injuries, (2) Appellant was only 
awoken after Lewis retrieved the unresponsive victim from her 
crib, and (3) the victim appeared to be acting normally until 
after Appellant put the victim to sleep and went to sleep herself.  
As in Smith, medical testimony adduced at trial indicated that 
the victim would not have appeared "normal" within a short 
period of time after her injuries were inflicted due to the nature 
4 State v. Smith, 359 S.C. 481, 597 S.E.2d 888 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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and extent of her neurological injuries. However, there is no 
evidence that Appellant herself was aware of the victim's 
injuries, let alone caused them.  Thus, we find this case 
distinguishable from Smith. 
In Smith, the mother and her boyfriend were jointly tried for the death of the 
mother's young daughter.  Both defendants were convicted of homicide by child 
abuse and aiding and abetting that offense.  On appeal, the boyfriend argued he 
was entitled to a directed verdict on both counts as the evidence showed, at most, 
his mere presence at the crime scene.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding the 
evidence showed the two defendants were together with the child for the entire 
period during which the child was shaken with sufficient force to kill her, and 
suffered more than one blow to the head inflicted with sufficient force to fracture 
her skull. Further, the evidence showed that her impairment would have been 
obvious. In addition, there was "evidence of a probable cover-up."   
Here, the State's evidence narrowed the window of opportunity during which the 
fatal injury must have been inflicted to between 4:00 pm and 6:05 pm on Sunday, 
July 14. The State's evidence placed both petitioners at the home during this 
period. Just as the only evidence in Hepburn was that the appellant was asleep at 
all critical times, the only evidence here was that the child was sleeping and 
breathing normally until Gorman found him in distress shortly after 6:00 pm.  
Further, the present cases are distinguishable from Smith in that petitioners were 
not together at all relevant times, and unlike Smith, where the only evidence was 
the child's injuries would have been immediately apparent, here there was evidence 
that a layperson might not be able to distinguish between a sleeping child and an 
unconscious one. Finally, unlike Smith, the State presented no "evidence of a 
probable cover-up."
We hold there is sufficient evidence to uphold the Court of Appeals' ruling that the 
motion for a directed verdict on homicide by child abuse charge was properly 
denied as to Gorman, but hold there is no evidence to support the denial of 
Palmer's motion.  The State's evidence places Gorman alone with the victim at 4:00 
pm when she first returned home and again at 6:00 pm when the victim was found 
in grave distress. The medical evidence would support a finding that Gorman 
inflicted the fatal blow when she first returned home and that when she and Palmer 
checked on the child from the doorway at 4:15 pm, the victim's injuries may not 
have been apparent to a layperson.  Alternatively, there was evidence that the 
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blow(s) must have been inflicted immediately preceding the expression of 
symptoms, which is evidence from which a jury could conclude that Gorman 
injured the child when she went alone to check on him at 6:00 pm.  Further, 
Gorman admitted mistreating the victim by shaking, spanking, and overdosing 
him, and numerous witnesses testified to her unusual affect and statements 
following the child's injury. 
 
There was sufficient circumstantial evidence that Gorman committed homicide by 
child abuse, but there is no evidence in the case-in-chief that Palmer was alone 
with the victim after around 3:30 pm, when the victim fell asleep.  Thus, as in 
Hepburn, the State produced no evidence that Palmer "was aware of the victim's 
injuries, let alone caused them."  Hepburn, 406 S.C. at 442, 753 S.E.2d at 416. 
 
B. Unlawful Conduct Towards a Child. 
 
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of both petitioners' motions for 
directed verdicts on the charges of unlawful conduct towards a child in violation of 
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-5-70 (2010).5  This statute provides: 
 
(A) It is unlawful for a person who has charge or custody of a 
child, or who is the parent or guardian of a child, or who is 
responsible for the welfare of a child as defined in Section 63-
7-20 to: 
 
 (1) place the child at unreasonable risk of harm affecting 
the child's life, physical or mental health, or safety; 
 
 (2) do or cause to be done unlawfully or maliciously any 
bodily harm to the child so that the life or health of the 
child is endangered or likely to be endangered; or 
 
 (3) willfully abandon the child. 
 
We find there is no evidence in this record that Palmer either harmed the victim or 
was aware Gorman was harming him.  In fact, the State does not contest Palmer's 
entitlement to a directed verdict on this charge in its respondent's brief on 
5 At the time of the petitioners' indictment this statute was codified as § 20-7-50. 
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certiorari. On the other hand, Gorman told at least two people that she was 
continuing to give the victim Xyzal, which has a sedative effect, after it was no 
longer medically indicated, and in amounts three to five times the recommended 
dosage. This alone is some evidence she placed the victim at an unreasonable risk 
of harm.  Further, she admitted lacking patience, smacking the victim on his hands 
and his diapered behind, and shaking him, but not hard.  From this evidence, a jury 
could find Gorman acted maliciously in causing bodily harm, as reflected in the 
unusual bruises found on the victim's body on July 14.   
We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm the trial court's denial of
Gorman's directed verdict motion on the charge of unlawful conduct towards a 
child, but reverse its decision as to Palmer's motion. 
C. Aiding and Abetting Homicide by Child Abuse.
The Court of Appeals reversed both petitioners' convictions for aiding and abetting 
homicide by child abuse, stating simply "we find the State presented no direct 
evidence and insubstantial circumstantial evidence that either Palmer or Gorman 
knowingly undertook any action to aid or abet that abuse." State v. Palmer, 408 
S.C. at 234, 758 S.E.2d at 205. The State contends the Court of Appeals erred in 
reversing these convictions.  We disagree. 
A person aids and abets homicide by child abuse under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-
85(A)(2) (2003) when he "knowingly aids and abets another person to commit 
child abuse or neglect [which] results in the death of a child under the age of 
eleven."  The State would have the Court speculate, despite the absence of any 
evidence, that both petitioners actually entered the victim's bedroom around 4:30 
pm where one abused him in the presence of the other, who thus aided and abetted 
the perpetrator by failing to seek medical help for an hour and a half.  Compare 
Smith, supra. There is no evidence other than rank speculation that such an 
incident occurred. Moreover, while "omission which causes harm" can constitute 
aiding and abetting child abuse or neglect (§ 16-3-85(B)(1)), there is no evidence 
that more prompt treatment would have mitigated the victim's injuries and thus we 
do not perceive potential liability for the non-abuser even if he or she were aware 
of the abuse. For this reason, even were there evidence that Palmer had hurt the 
victim during the day while alone, there is no evidence that any delay in seeking 
medical attention by Gorman caused the victim harm beyond that inflicted by the 
perpetrator. Finally, State v. Lewis, 403 S.C. 345, 743 S.E.2d 124 (Ct. App. 2013) 
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cert. dismissed as improvidently granted 411 S.C. 647, 770 S.E.2d 398 (2015), 
establishes that neither knowledge of another's intent to commit a crime nor failure 
to act to stop abuse are sufficient to deny a directed verdict on a charge of aiding 
and abetting homicide by child abuse.  Lewis, 403 S.C. at 356, 743 S.E.2d at 129-
130.
We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to reverse the trial court's 
denial of each petitioner's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of aiding and 
abetting homicide by child abuse. 
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling on the aiding and abetting homicide by 
child abuse convictions. We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to the extent it 
upholds the denial of Gorman's directed verdict motions on the charges of 
homicide by child abuse and unlawful conduct towards a child, but reverse its 
decisions as to Palmer.  For these reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART. 
TOAL, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur. 
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JUSTICE HEARN: In this attorney malpractice case, Amber Johnson 
alleges her closing attorney, Stanley Alexander, breached his duty of care by 
failing to discover the house Johnson purchased had been sold at a tax sale the 
previous year. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of 
Johnson as to Alexander's liability.  On appeal, the court of appeals held Alexander
could not be held liable as a matter of law simply because the attorney he hired to 
perform the title work may have been negligent.  Instead, the court determined the 
relevant inquiry was "whether Alexander acted with reasonable care in relying on 
[another attorney's] title search"; accordingly, it reversed and remanded.  Johnson 
v. Alexander, 408 S.C. 58, 64, 757 S.E.2d 553, 556 (Ct. App. 2014).  We disagree 
and find the trial court properly granted summary judgment as to liability.  We 
therefore remand to the trial court for a hearing on damages. 
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Alexander acted as Johnson's closing attorney when she purchased a home 
in North Charleston on September 14, 2006.  The title examination for the home 
had been performed by attorney Charles Feeley at the request of Johnson's
previous attorney, Mario Inglese. Alexander purchased the title work from Inglese 
and relied on this title exam in concluding there were no back taxes owed on the
property.  Thereafter, Johnson learned the house had been sold at a tax sale and she 
did not have title to the property. In fact, the property had been sold October 3, 
2005, almost a year prior to Johnson's purchase.  Because of the title issue, the
mortgage payments on the home ceased and the property eventually went to
foreclosure. 
Johnson brought this cause of action for malpractice, breach of fiduciary 
duty, and breach of contract against Alexander and Inglese.  Specifically, Johnson
alleged the attorneys owed her a duty to perform a complete title exam on the 
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property to ensure she received good and clear title.  
Johnson moved for partial summary judgment as to Alexander's liability. 
At the hearing, Johnson submitted the affidavit of Mary Scarborough, the
Delinquent Tax Collector for Charleston County.  She attested that she "had direct 
and personal knowledge that information regarding delinquent taxes for real 
properties located in Charleston County, South Carolina, was readily and publicly 
available in July, August and September of 2006" in the Office of the Register 
Mesné Conveyance for Charleston County via a mainframe database. 
Furthermore, she stated that the Delinquent Tax data for Charleston County real 
properties has been publicly available on a mainframe database since 1997, when 
she helped design the system currently in use.  
Alexander presented an affidavit from Feeley stating that although he could 
not remember the specific details of this title exam, he conducted all his 
examinations the same.  Feeley further detailed his process at length, explaining 
his reliance on the Charleston County Online Tax Systems and his practice of 
searching back ten years of tax payments. He indicated his notes showed he found 
no back taxes due or owing. Feeley also attested that a prior tax sale would not 
have been disclosed in the chain of title for this property or made publically
available in the RMC office at the time of the title examination and closing in 2006 
because the tax sale deed was not recorded until December 12, 2006.  
The circuit court granted Johnson's motion as to Alexander's liability.  The 
court relied heavily on Alexander's pleadings and admissions in his deposition that 
as a closing attorney he had a responsibility to ensure marketable title. 
Additionally, the court found Alexander had proximately caused Johnson's 
damages, but left the determination of the amount for a later hearing. 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding the circuit
court incorrectly focused "its inquiry on whether an attorney conducting a title 
search on this property should have discovered the delinquent taxes from 2003 and 
2004 and the tax sale from 2005."  Johnson, 408 S.C. at 62, 757 S.E.2d at 555.
Instead, the court of appeals held the proper question was "whether Alexander 
acted reasonably under the existing circumstances in relying on the title search
performed by Feeley."  Id. at 63, 757 S.E.2d at 555.  Finding there was a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Alexander acted reasonably, the court of 
appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for trial. Id. at 64, 
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757 S.E.2d at 556. This Court granted certiorari to review the opinion of the court
of appeals. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the court of appeals err in reversing the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment and remanding the case for trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court applies the same 
standard as the circuit court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP.  Stevens & Wilkinson 
of S.C., Inc. v. City of Columbia, 409 S.C. 568, 576, 762 S.E.2d 696, 700 (2014). 
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 56(c), SCRCP. In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the 
Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Evening Post Pub. Co. v. Berkeley 
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 392 S.C. 76, 81–82, 708 S.E.2d 745, 748 (2011).  To withstand a
summary judgment motion in cases applying the preponderance of the evidence
burden of proof, the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of 
evidence. Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 122, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Johnson argues the court of appeals erred in reversing the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment because it misapprehended the proper standard of care.
Specifically, Johnson argues the court of appeals erred in holding the requisite 
inquiry is whether an attorney reasonably relied on another attorney's work where 
that work is outsourced. Johnson contends that an attorney should be liable for 
negligence arising from tasks he chose to delegate unless he has expressly limited 
the scope of his representation. We agree. 
In a claim for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of
an attorney-client relationship; (2) a breach of duty by the attorney; (3) damage to 
the client; and (4) proximate cause of the client's damages by the breach.  Harris 
Teeter, Inc. v. Moore & Van Allen, PLLC, 390 S.C. 275, 282, 701 S.E.2d 742, 745 
(2010). An attorney is required to render services with the degree of skill, care, 
knowledge, and judgment usually possessed and exercised by members of the 
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profession.  Holy Loch Distribs., Inc. v. Hitchcock, 340 S.C. 20, 26, 531 S.E.2d 
282, 285 (2000). 
In determining the scope of Alexander's duty, we accept his consistent
characterization of this responsibility—ensuring Johnson received good title.  In 
her complaint, Johnson alleged "[d]efendants had professional duties to ensure that 
Plaintiff was receiving good and clear title to the subject property free of any 
encumbrances, liens, or clouds on title before conducting the closing and if there 
was a problem after the closing, to correct said deficiencies and/or advise Plaintiff 
how to correct said deficiencies."  In Alexander's answer he admitted those 
allegations. Parties are generally bound by their pleadings and are precluded from 
advancing arguments or submitting evidence contrary to those assertions.  Elrod v. 
All, 243 S.C. 425, 436, 134 S.E.2d 410, 416 (1964) ("[T]he general rule[ is] that 
the parties to an action are judicially concluded and bound by such unless 
withdrawn, altered or stricken by amendment or otherwise. The allegations,
statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the 
pleader. It follows that a party cannot subsequently take a position contradictory 
of, or inconsistent with, his pleadings and the facts which are admitted by the 
pleadings are to be taken as true against the pleader for the purpose of the action. 
Evidence contradicting such pleadings is inadmissible.").  Additionally, during 
Alexander's deposition, he plainly conceded he owed a duty to Johnson to have
clear title: 
Q. Alright.  And you were hired, or you were her attorney for this 
closing? Right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you had responsibility to make sure that she got good and 
marketable title? Correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And that's one of the responsibilities of a lawyer handling the 
closing, representing the purchaser? Right? 
A. Correct. 
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Alexander cannot now assert his duty was anything other than what he has 
admitted—that he ensure good and clear title. 
 However, even absent Alexander's admissions, we find the court of appeals 
erroneously equated delegation of a task with delegation of liability. Certainly, 
Feeley's negligence is the issue here, but that does not displace Alexander's 
ultimate responsibility.  While an attorney may delegate certain tasks to other 
attorneys or staff, it does not follow that the attorney's professional decision to do 
so can change his liability to his client absent that client's clear, counseled consent. 
See Rule 1.8(h), RPC, RULE 407, SCACR ("A lawyer shall not. . . make an 
agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice 
unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement.").  Thus, 
Alexander owed Johnson a duty and absent her agreement otherwise, he was liable 
for that responsibility regardless of how he chose to have it carried out.1 
We therefore agree with Johnson that an attorney is liable for negligence in 
tasks he delegates absent some express limitation of his representation.  Stated 
another way, without an express limitation in representation, attorneys cannot 
delegate liability for tasks that are undertaken in carrying out the duty owed the
client. See 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 289 ("Since an attorney has, in general, 
no authority to employ another attorney to attend to the matters in which the first 
attorney has been retained, it follows that, if the first attorney does entrust to
another the performance or prosecution of matters entrusted to him or her, the first 
1 Alexander separately alleges that because Johnson knew he did not personally 
perform the title examination, its accuracy was not within the scope of his 
representation of her. We find this contention unpersuasive.  Pursuant to Rule 
1.2(c), of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR, "A lawyer may 
limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the 
circumstances and the client gives informed consent."  In determining whether an 
attorney obtained informed consent, comment 6 to Rule 1.0 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR, clarifes that "A lawyer need not inform a 
client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other 
person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other 
person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and 
the consent is invalid."  Even assuming Johnson knew Alexander purchased the 
title work from another attorney, this does not alleviate Alexander's responsibility 
to ensure good title.  It would only indicate she is aware he has delegated a task.  
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attorney becomes liable to the client for any negligence or wrongdoing on the part
of the other attorney."). A holding to the contrary would effectively allow an 
attorney to independently limit the scope of his representation through the manner 
in which he performs his duties instead of being bound by what the client
understands his responsibilities to be. 
Applying this standard to the facts, we find the grant of summary judgment 
was proper because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to liability.  The 
circuit court relied on Scarborough's affidavit in concluding Johnson "proved to the
Court what the public records reflected at the time of closing—taxes for the 
Property were delinquent for the tax years 2003 and 2004 and the Property had 
been sold on October 5, 2005 at a tax sale."  Although Alexander submitted an 
affidavit by Feeley stating he would have discovered the information if it was 
public, we agree with the circuit court's ultimate conclusion that there was no issue 
of fact. Feeley admitted he did not remember the specifics of that transaction and 
provided no documentation supporting his assertion that he performed a ten year 
search and found no notice of the sale. 
Furthermore, we find the circuit court properly held there was no genuine 
issue of material fact as to proximate cause.  Because of Alexander's failure to 
discover the tax sale, Johnson did not receive marketable title—or any title—to the 
property she purchased. She was therefore unable to sell or rent the property.
Alexander's arguments that the property foreclosure was due to Johnson's own 
negligence in failing to pay the mortgage will certainly be considered during the 
hearing on damages; however, that allegation does not alter the fact that Johnson's 
purchase of the property that had already been sold was a direct result of his failure 
to ensure she received good title. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the opinion of the court of appeals and 
hold an attorney is liable for negligence in tasks he chooses to delegate absent an 
express limitation of his representation.  Finding Alexander breached his duty and 
damages resulted, we reinstate the grant of partial summary judgment as to 
Alexander's liability and remand for a determination of damages. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, KITTREDGE, JJ., and Acting Justice 
James E. Moore, concur. 
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SHORT, J.:  Norman J. Hayes (Petitioner) appeals from the denial and dismissal 
of his application for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing his sentence exceeded 
the maximum authorized by law because sentencing credit for time served was not 
properly applied by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (the 
Department). We reverse. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 2004, Petitioner pled guilty to possession of crack cocaine and criminal 
conspiracy. The trial judge sentenced Petitioner to five years' imprisonment, 
suspended to time served and three years' probation; ordered Petitioner to pay 
$225; and credited Petitioner with 240 days of time served. 
Petitioner was subsequently charged with various probation violations, and on July 
30, 2010, the probation revocation judge revoked his probation and reinstated his 
five-year suspended sentences. On rehearing, the probation revocation judge 
reduced the reinstated sentences to three years and terminated probation, noting 
Petitioner had previously served 240 days; thus, he would receive credit for the 
240 days served. On September 27, 2011, Petitioner filed his application for PCR, 
alleging he was being unlawfully detained because the Department did not apply 
the 240 days to his reduced sentence. 
Michael Stobbe, the branch chief of release and records management for the 
Department, testified at the PCR hearing. Stobbe stated Petitioner served 240 days 
of pretrial detention, and when his probation was revoked, the Department 
subtracted 240 days from five years, "which gave him a total sentence of four years 
and 125 days and an incarcerative sentence of four years and 125 days." When 
asked whether the Department gave Petitioner credit for time served on the three-
year sentence, the following colloquy occurred:
A: Yes, sir, the 240 days was applied to his total 
sentence. In other words, five years minus the 240 days, 
which would give him a total sentence of [four] years and 
125 days. 
Q: Was it applied to the three-year sentence that was
modified on February 4th? 
59 

   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
A: Yes, sir. The 240 days was applied to the 
remainder of the original five-year sentence.   
Q: But it wasn't credited toward the three years that he 
was actually serving; is that right?  
A: Well, you have a total sentence and an 
incarcerative sentence. Two hundred forty days, with a 
command of the English language, couldn't be reduced -- 
could not reduce the three years. So the 240 days 
reduced his total sentence from five years to four years 
and 125 days. The 240 days was not subtracted from the 
three years, no, sir. 
Q: But it was subtracted from the five years that he 
was no longer serving? 
A: No. As far as I know, on the Form 9 on both 
February 4, 2011, and July 30, 2010, the remainder of the 
original sentence on the Form 9 was never marked out.  
So he is still held responsible for the total sentence of 
five years minus the 240 days.  That's what his parole
date is based on. 
Stobbe testified, "[T]he 240 days has got to come off the five years.  It can't be 
subtracted from three years."
The Form 9 was created by the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole 
and Pardon Services. The Form 9 includes a charging section, listing the probation 
conditions the Petitioner is alleged to have violated and the probation revocation 
judge's findings on the allegations.  The second section was prefaced, "Therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED that:" and followed by numerous sentencing choices.  In this 
case, the judge ordered "the suspended sentence be revoked and the [Petitioner] be 
required to serve 3 . . . years, the remainder of the original sentence, and/or pay 
$ XX TERMINATE PROBATION." The sentence entitled "Additional Conditions 
ordered by the Court" included the judge's statement, "CONVERT FINE TO 
CIVIL JUDGMENT." The third section of the Form 9 included two sentences, 
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which the judge checked as applying in this case.1  First, "[t]he defendant is given 
credit for pre-revocation hearing detention time on current probation violation . . . 
." Second, "[t]he defendant has previously served  240 days on this sentence." 
In parentheses beneath the second sentence, the form reads, "split sentence time 
and/or prior partial revocation time."  
In response to the PCR court's questions, Stobbe admitted if the Form 9 had stated 
"three years" and "the remainder of the original sentence" language was crossed 
out, the Department would consider Petitioner's sentence would be three years.  
Stobbe further stated if "Credit for 240 days time served" had been written in the 
portion of the Form 9 providing, "Additional Conditions ordered by the Court," the 
Department would have given Petitioner the credit for 240 days on the three-year 
sentence. Finally, Stobbe stated if the probation revocation court had omitted the 
sentence, "The defendant previously served 240 days on this sentence," it "would 
have sort of put us into the investigative mode" to determine if Petitioner was 
entitled to time served on his three-year sentence. 
Petitioner testified that when he began serving the revoked portion of his sentence, 
his projected release date was March 2013.  He stated when his sentence was 
reduced to three years, his projected release date became April 2012, including 
good time credit.  Petitioner further stated his projected release date at the time of 
the PCR hearing was February 18, 2012, which also included earned work credits. 
In its order dismissing Petitioner's application, the PCR court noted Petitioner's 
original sentence was a split sentence,2 the "time served" was Petitioner's pre-
sentence detention of 240 days, and "he was given credit for that time by being 
released directly from sentencing to probation."  The PCR court found the 
probation revocation judge "simply noted that [Petitioner] had previously served 
240 days on this sentence, but [the probation court] did not, and should not, have 
awarded double credit for the 240 days . . . ."  The PCR court further found when a 
court imposes a split sentence, "time served prior to trial should not be used to 
calculate the amount of time a probationer must serve on a reinstated sentence, 
1 A third sentence relating to electronic monitoring was also included in this 
section. 
2 "[A] 'true split sentence[]' occurs when the judge sentences the defendant to 
incarceration but suspends a portion of the term." Franklin v. State, 545 So.2d 
851, 852 (Fla. 1989).
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because the pretrial detention time was already awarded to satisfy the time served 
portion of the split sentence."  The court found the Form 9 does not change the fact 
that Petitioner had already received credit for his time served and the only sentence 
is the one imposed by the original sentencing judge.3  The PCR court dismissed 
Petitioner's application, and this petition for a writ of certiorari followed.  
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
In an action for PCR, an appellate court reviews questions of law de novo, and it 
will reverse the PCR court's decision when it is controlled by an error of law.  
Jordan v. State, 406 S.C. 443, 448, 752 S.E.2d 538, 540 (2013). 
 
IV. LAW/ANALYSIS  
 
Petitioner argues the PCR court erred in dismissing his application because the 
plain language of the statute explaining how prison time should be calculated 
requires pretrial detention credit to be awarded to a partially revoked sentence.  He 
argues the Department misapplied the statute, and notes if the Department applied 
the statute in the same way to a full revocation, the result would be a longer 
sentence than authorized by law.  We agree.   
 
The PCR statute allows an inmate to file an application for PCR when he claims 
his sentence has expired and he is being unlawfully held in custody.  S.C. Code 
Ann. § 17-27-20(5) (2014). Because Petitioner is no longer incarcerated, this issue 
is moot.  However, "an appellate court can take jurisdiction, despite mootness, if 
the issue raised is capable of repetition but evading review." Curtis v. State, 345 
S.C. 557, 568, 549 S.E.2d 591, 596 (2001).  The issue here is capable of repetition 
but evading review; therefore, we address the merits.  See Nelson v. Ozmint, 390 
S.C. 432, 433-34, 702 S.E.2d 369, 370 (2010) (addressing moot issue of the 
Department's calculation of the prisoner's sentence as not including good time 
credits or earned work credits because it was an issue that was capable of 
repetition, yet it would usually evade review).   
3 The PCR court took judicial notice that the Form 9 had been modified in recent 
years, but the section governing split sentences had remained the same for over ten 
years. 
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Section 24-13-40 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014) provides the following:  
The computation of the time served by prisoners under 
sentences imposed by the courts of this State must be 
calculated from the date of the imposition of the 
sentence. However, when . . . (b) the commencement of 
the service of the sentence follows the revocation of 
probation, . . . the computation of the time served must be 
calculated from the date of the commencement of the 
service of the sentence. In every case in computing the 
time served by a prisoner, full credit against the sentence 
must be given for time served prior to trial and 
sentencing, and may be given for any time spent under 
monitored house arrest.  Provided, however, that credit 
for time served prior to trial and sentencing shall not be 
given: (1) when the prisoner at the time he was 
imprisoned prior to trial was an escapee from another 
penal institution; or (2) when the prisoner is serving a 
sentence for one offense and is awaiting trial and 
sentence for a second offense in which case he shall not 
receive credit for time served prior to trial in a reduction 
of his sentence for the second offense. 
The requirement that a prisoner receive credit for time served is mandatory.  State 
v. Boggs, 388 S.C. 314, 316, 696 S.E.2d 597, 598 (Ct. App. 2010).  In Boggs, the 
sentencing judge indicated he did not want to give the defendant credit for time 
served and did not check off the box on the sentencing sheet indicating credit for 
time served. Id. at 316, 696 S.E.2d at 598.  The judge acknowledged the defendant 
was entitled to credit but stated on the record that "when I don't check it off" the 
Department would not give the defendant the credit, concluding, "I am just telling 
you how it works in the real world."  Id. at 315-16, 696 S.E.2d at 598. This court 
reversed the sentencing judge, finding the statutory credit for time served was
mandatory and "[a] judge's disappointment in the maximum sentence he can 
impose is not one of the exceptions to the mandatory language" in the statute.  Id.
at 316, 696 S.E.2d at 598. 
Thus, a prisoner will receive credit for time served unless either (1) they were an 
escapee or (2) the prisoner was already serving a sentence on a different offense.  
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S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-40 (Supp. 2014).  Furthermore, section 24-21-460 of the 
South Carolina Code provides a court may "revoke the probation or suspension of 
[a] sentence" and has the discretion "to require the defendant to serve all or a 
portion only of the sentence imposed."  S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-460 (2007). 
"Where the terms of a statute are clear, the court must apply those terms according 
to their literal meaning." Allen v. State, 339 S.C. 393, 395, 529 S.E.2d 541, 542 
(2000). "The words of the statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning 
without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand its scope."  Id. 
We find the PCR court erred as a matter of law when it determined a probationer 
who receives a split sentence should not receive credit for time served prior to trial 
against a reinstated sentence "because the pretrial detention time was already 
awarded to satisfy the time served portion of the split sentence."  This finding 
contradicts section 24-13-40, which states the following: "[W]hen . . . (b) the 
commencement of the service of the sentence follows the revocation of probation, . 
. . the computation of the time served shall be reckoned from the date of the 
commencement of the service of the sentence.  In every case . . . full credit . . . 
shall be given for time served prior to trial and sentencing."  § 24-13-40.  The 
statute does not make a distinction for split sentences; thus, under the plain 
language of the statute, we find the pre-trial detention time should apply against a 
probation revocation whenever a probationer receives a split sentence.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the decision of the PCR court is  
REVERSED. 
LOCKEMY and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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GEATHERS, J.:  In this breach of contract action, Appellant Lifepoint Hospitals, 
Inc. (Lifepoint) seeks review of the circuit court's denial of its motion to compel 
arbitration. Lifepoint argues the circuit court incorrectly applied the law-of-the-
case doctrine to the motion to compel.  Lifepoint also argues the circuit court 
incorrectly applied the "commerce in fact" test to determine whether the physician 
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services performed by Respondent Phillip Flexon, M.D. affected interstate 
commerce and, thus, triggered the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).  We affirm.   
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In the fall of 2006, Lifepoint and Flexon negotiated for Flexon's employment with 
PHC-Jasper, Inc., d/b/a Coastal Carolina Medical Center (PHC), in Hardeeville, 
South Carolina. Lifepoint owned Province Healthcare Company, which owned 
PHC. At the time, Flexon had a medical practice in Savannah, Georgia and was on 
the staff of Memorial University Medical Center (Memorial) in Savannah.  
However, Flexon was living in Hardeeville and desired to practice medicine there.  
Therefore, on December 18, 2006, Flexon and PHC executed a contract for Flexon 
to begin employment with PHC on March 15, 2007, for a five-year term
(Agreement). Flexon's medical practice was to be located at 1010 Medical Center 
Drive in Hardeeville and "such other practice sites in Beaufort and Jasper 
Counties . . . reasonably designated by [PHC] from time to time."  The Agreement 
prohibited any "transfer, assignment or other modification affecting the terms or 
conditions of the [Agreement]" unless "extenuating circumstances [were] shown to 
exist." 
The Agreement contained the following provisions regarding litigation and 
arbitration: 
13.4 Governing Law and Venue. This Agreement 
shall be governed by, and construed and enforced in 
accordance with, the laws of the State of South Carolina.  
Any action or claim arising from, under or pursuant to 
this Agreement shall be brought in the courts, state or 
federal, within the State of South Carolina, and the 
parties expressly waive the right to bring any legal action 
or claims in any other courts.  The parties hereto hereby 
[sic] consent to venue in any state or federal court within 
the State of South Carolina having jurisdiction over the 
County for all purposes in connection with any action or 
proceeding commenced between the parties hereto in 
connection with or arising from this Agreement. 
13.5 Arbitration. Except as to the provisions contained 
in Articles VIII and IX [Disclosure of Information and 
Covenant Not to Compete], the exclusive jurisdiction of 
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which shall rest with a court of competent jurisdiction in 
the state where the hospital is located[,] any controversy 
or claim arising out of or related to this Agreement, or 
any breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in the 
County, in accordance with the rules and procedures of 
alternative dispute resolution and arbitration . . . , and 
judgment upon any award rendered may be entered in 
any court having jurisdiction thereof. 
 
(emphases added). 
 
After Flexon began employment with PHC, he remained on the staff at Memorial 
and continued to see patients coming from Georgia.  On or about June 30, 2007, 
Province Healthcare Company, Lifepoint's wholly owned subsidiary, sold PHC to 
Tenet Healthsystems, Inc. (Tenet).  Tenet then presented Flexon with an 
"Amendment to and Assignment of Physician Employment Agreement" purporting 
to assign the Agreement to Tenet. Flexon refused to execute this document.1    
 
On or about August 17, 2007, PHC changed its name to Coastal Carolina Medical 
Center, Inc. (Coastal). Approximately one year later, Flexon sent a formal notice 
of termination for cause to Coastal (formerly PHC).  In May 2009, Coastal sent 
Flexon a letter demanding over $725,000 for amounts Coastal claimed it was owed 
pursuant to various provisions of the Agreement.  Coastal also demanded that 
Flexon immediately cease working for Memorial.   
 
On May 26, 2009, Flexon filed this breach of contract action against Coastal (a 
twice-removed subsidiary of Lifepoint), Lifepoint, and Tenet, alleging that prior to 
entering into the Agreement, Lifepoint failed to disclose it was in negotiations with 
Tenet for Tenet's purchase of PHC's (now Coastal's) assets.  The Complaint stated 
Flexon's performance of the Agreement required him to close his practice in 
Savannah, "where he had privileges at surgical hospitals."  The Complaint also 
alleged that during the negotiation of the Agreement, Lifepoint represented that 
PHC would purchase certain equipment needed by Flexon in the operating room 
1 Ironically, when Flexon was negotiating the Agreement with Lifepoint's CEO in 
2006, Flexon mentioned he was glad he wasn't working for Tenet: "[W]e had 
multiple conversations about how awful Tenet was.  That -- the Hilton Head 
[h]ospital, their problems, and that I -- that I was glad that I wasn't working for 
them."   
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and would recruit and hire an audiologist to be part of Flexon's practice but PHC 
later refused to honor these representations. 
On October 23, 2009, Coastal filed a motion to compel arbitration, asserting the 
Agreement contained a valid and enforceable arbitration provision.  During the 
motions hearing, Coastal stipulated that the arbitration provision in the Agreement 
violated the notice requirements of the South Carolina Arbitration Act but argued 
the FAA applied to the arbitration provision and, thus, required arbitration of the 
parties' claims.  To support its argument that the Agreement evidenced a 
transaction involving interstate commerce, triggering the FAA,2 Coastal referenced 
the Complaint's allegations that (1) Flexon had to "discontinue, close, and leave an 
established practice in Savannah, Georgia, where he had privileges at surgical 
hospitals" in order to sign the Agreement and (2) Lifepoint knew that Flexon 
"would have to close and terminate an established practice in Savannah in order to 
fulfill his obligations under the [Agreement]."   
Additionally, Coastal referred to three of Flexon's interrogatory responses: 
[I]n an answer to an interrogatory that we filed, he said 
that many Savannah doctors stopped referring patients to 
Dr. Flexon after a [stock] purchase agreement occurred 
between our clients. I think the implication here is that 
he was getting business across state lines, and was 
relying on that business in order to have a successful 
practice. 
On Interrogatory Four, which was a particularized 
statement of damages, he mentions that he lost six weeks 
of his salary while he had to move his practice from 
Savannah to Coastal, and then move it back again once 
he quit. 
Interrogatory Nine, which was about availability of 
equipment in the E.R., which is one of the complaints Dr. 
Flexon had against my client.  He said that availability of 
2 See Towles v. United HealthCare Corp., 338 S.C. 29, 35, 524 S.E.2d 839, 843 
(Ct. App. 1999) ("For the FAA to apply, an agreement must 'evidenc[e] a 
transaction involving commerce,' specifically interstate commerce." (alteration by 
court) (quoting 9 U.S.C.A. § 2)). 
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equipment became so unreliable, [Flexon] began taking 
his complicated cases to Memorial. . . . So, while he was 
working for our client, he was sending his complicated 
cases and performing those surgeries that were being 
billed by our hospital, performing that surgery in 
Savannah.
Subsequently, Lifepoint's counsel briefly spoke in support of Coastal's motion to
compel:   
[COUNSEL]:  Judge, if I may; I'm not presenting 
argument. This is not our motion today, but we pled this 
as an affirmative defense as well, that this matter should 
be submitted to arbitration.  I think it goes to arbitration 
and it should. We support this motion.  It goes as to all 
parties. If I have to separately move, I can do that, but --- 
whereupon counsel was cut off by the presiding judge (the first circuit court 
judge). The following colloquy then transpired: 
THE COURT: I think you ought to do that, because 
obviously [Flexon] isn't on notice of that.  I understand 
that's your position, but all I can deal with is this motion 
today. But I understand that.  I think you need to file 
your own motion.  And I realize you pled it. 
[COUNSEL]:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: But he wasn't prepared to argue, except 
as against this motion today.  It might be an identical 
argument, but ---
[COUNSEL]:  I think that likely it is.  So I will make it. 
On June 17, 2010, Lifepoint filed its own motion to compel arbitration.  
Subsequently, the first circuit court judge issued an order denying Coastal's 
motion.  The first circuit court judge based his decision on two grounds: "There is 
no language in the [Agreement that] mentions, conditions, requires, affects or 
involves interstate commerce. . . .  Further, . . . the parties to [the Agreement] 
specifically agreed to litigate any dispute arising from, under or pursuant to [the 
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Agreement] in the courts of South Carolina."3  Coastal appealed the first circuit 
court judge's order to this court, which affirmed the order.  Flexon v. PHC-Jasper, 
Inc., 399 S.C. 83, 731 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 2012) (Flexon I). This court concluded 
the Agreement and surrounding facts did not implicate interstate commerce and, 
therefore, the FAA did not apply to the Agreement.  399 S.C. at 89, 731 S.E.2d at 
4. After the case was remitted, Lifepoint withdrew its motion to compel arbitration 
without prejudice and took Flexon's deposition.   
During his deposition, Flexon admitted his performance under the Agreement 
involved providing medical services in both South Carolina and Georgia.  When 
asked about problems resulting from trying to transport a practice from Georgia to 
South Carolina, Flexon stated, "[T]he practice wasn't transported.  The practice 
always existed in both states before and after.  It really did. I mean, it was -- you 
know, it -- by -- by accident there's a river and a state line, but the practice always 
involved both states."  Flexon also stated that he had "plenty of patients coming 
from Georgia."  Moreover, Flexon indicated that Lifepoint's CEO, Eric Deaton, 
insisted Flexon remain on Memorial's staff.  Therefore, Flexon often had to do 
rounds at both Coastal and Memorial.   
Lifepoint then filed with the circuit court its renewed motion to compel arbitration, 
attaching the above-referenced excerpts from Flexon's deposition.  Several weeks 
later, Coastal filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), 
SCRCP, seeking relief from the circuit court's previous order denying arbitration 
due to "newly discovered evidence," i.e., Flexon's deposition testimony.  The 
presiding judge (the second circuit court judge) conducted a hearing on both 
motions and later issued an order denying them.   
In his order, the second circuit court judge stated,  
3 Coastal did not appeal this second ground, i.e., the parties agreed to litigate any 
dispute "arising from, under or pursuant to [the Agreement] in the courts of South 
Carolina." Rather, Coastal merely addressed this issue in its Reply Brief, asserting 
that the provision in question "concern[ed] only those portions of the Agreement 
carved out of the Arbitration provision" in Article XIII, i.e. "Except as to the 
provisions contained in Articles VIII and IX, the exclusive jurisdiction of which 
shall rest with a court of competent jurisdiction in the state where the hospital is 
located, any controversy or claim arising out of or related to this Agreement, or 
any breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration . . . ." (emphasis added). 
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 As acknowledged by [Coastal] in its appeal, the parties 
knew that [Flexon] was receiving referrals and other 
patients from the Savannah area while he was working 
[for Coastal].  With these facts before it, the South 
Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that "We agree with the 
trial court's finding that the Agreement and the 
surrounding facts did not implicate interstate commerce."   
 
The second circuit court judge further found that the "facts and testimony from 
[Flexon's] deposition argued by [Lifepoint and Coastal] are not substantially 
different than those before the court in the prior rulings."   
 
The second circuit court judge concluded that if Lifepoint and Coastal believed 
Flexon's deposition "was necessary for a full review of this issue, they could have 
sought to present that contention to the lower and appellate courts when this issue 
was before them." He also concluded that this court's decision on the FAA's 
applicability to the Agreement was the law of the case.  Lifepoint filed a motion to 
alter or amend this order, which the second circuit court judge denied.  This appeal 
followed. 
 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
1. Did the circuit court err in concluding that Lifepoint failed to preserve its right 
to independently seek arbitration? 
 
2. Did the circuit court err in concluding that the decision of this court in Flexon I 
was the law of the case?4  
 
3. Did the circuit court err in failing to apply, or applying incorrectly, the 
"commerce in fact" test to determine whether Flexon's services affected interstate 
commerce and, thus, triggered the FAA? 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
"This court reviews questions of law de novo."  Proctor v. Steedley, 398 S.C. 561, 
573, 730 S.E.2d 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2012). "In other words, a reviewing court is 
free to decide questions of law with no particular deference to the trial court."  Id. 
 
                                                            
4 We are combining Lifepoint's Issues II and IV from its brief. 
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Furthermore, "[t]he question of the arbitrability of a claim is an issue for judicial 
determination, unless the parties provide otherwise."  Zabinski v. Bright Acres 
Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001).  "The determination of 
whether a claim is subject to arbitration is subject to de novo review." Gissel v. 
Hart, 382 S.C. 235, 240, 676 S.E.2d 320, 323 (2009).  "Nevertheless, a circuit 
court's factual findings will not be reversed on appeal if any evidence reasonably 
supports the findings."  Id.
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Preservation of Right to Seek Arbitration 
Lifepoint interprets the second circuit court judge's order as implying Lifepoint 
failed to preserve its right to independently seek arbitration.  In response, Lifepoint 
argues (1) several consent orders in this case have preserved Lifepoint's right to 
seek arbitration independent of Coastal's motion and allowed Lifepoint to engage 
in written discovery and depositions without waiving its right to arbitration5 and 
5 The first "Consent Scheduling Order of the Parties" was not executed until June 
16, 2010, after the hearing on Coastal's motion to compel arbitration.  This order 
includes a provision stating,  
The parties and this [c]ourt recognize that Defendant has 
moved to compel arbitration, and that this consent order 
in no way constitutes a waiver of Defendant's asserted 
right to compel arbitration.  The parties agree that the 
conduct of written discovery or depositions will not be 
evidence of a waiver of Defendants [sic] asserted right to 
arbitration. The Plaintiff also agrees that engaging in 
discovery pursuant to this order does not constitute 
prejudice or undue burden. 
Lifepoint executed its own motion to compel arbitration on the same day the 
parties executed the consent order but did not file the motion until the following 
day. 
The "Amended Consent Scheduling Order," dated September 18, 2012, is similar: 
The parties and this [c]ourt recognize that one of the 
Defendants may move to compel arbitration, and that this 
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 (2) it has prosecuted its arbitration motion pursuant to the directive of the first 
circuit court judge. 
 
We acknowledge the order now on appeal includes language implying Lifepoint 
waived its right to arbitration by engaging in discovery without reservation or 
limitation.  However, this language was not the basis for the denial of Lifepoint's 
motion to compel arbitration.  Rather, the second circuit court judge based his 
conclusion that this court's opinion in Flexon I was the law of the case on two 
grounds: (1) the facts presented in the hearing on Lifepoint's motion were not 
substantially different from the facts presented in the hearing on Coastal's motion 
and (2) Lifepoint effectively abandoned its opportunity to present Flexon's 
deposition testimony by failing to depose him prior to the hearing on Coastal's 
motion.  We will address these two grounds, as well as the first circuit court judge's 
directive for Lifepoint to file its own motion, in the following section of this 
opinion.   
 
II. Law of the Case 
 
Lifepoint asserts the second circuit court judge erred in concluding this court's 
opinion in Flexon I was the law of the case. Lifepoint argues Flexon's deposition 
testimony showed facts substantially different from the facts presented to the first 
circuit court judge. While we agree the facts were substantially different, the 
deposition testimony should have been presented to the first circuit court judge.  
Therefore, the second circuit court judge did not commit reversible error in 
concluding that Flexon I was the law of the case. 
 
"Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, a party is precluded from relitigating, after an 
appeal, matters that were either not raised on appeal, but should have been, or 
raised on appeal, but expressly rejected by the appellate court."  Judy v. Martin, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
consent order in no way constitutes a waiver of 
Defendant's asserted right to compel arbitration.  The 
parties agree that the conduct of written discovery or 
depositions will not be evidence of a waiver of 
Defendant's asserted right to arbitration.  The Plaintiff 
also agrees that engaging in discovery pursuant to this 
order does not constitute prejudice or undue burden. 
 
The comparable provisions in the "Second Amended Consent Scheduling Order" 
and "Third Amended Consent Scheduling Order" are identical to this provision.   
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381 S.C. 455, 458, 674 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2009) (citing 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 
991 (2007)). In other words, "[t]he doctrine of the law of the case prohibits issues 
[that] have been decided in a prior appeal from being relitigated in the trial court in 
the same case." Ross v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 328 S.C. 51, 62, 492 S.E.2d 62, 68 
(1997); see In re Grossinger's Assocs., 184 B.R. 429, 434 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
("Closely related to the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion is the doctrine of 
law of the case, which holds that a decision on an issue of law made at one stage of
a case becomes binding precedent to be followed in subsequent stages of the same 
litigation." (quotation marks omitted)).  While the doctrine has been referenced as 
discretionary,6 it is recognized that principles "of authority . . . do inhere in the 
'mandate rule' that binds a lower court on remand to the law of the case established 
on appeal." 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478 (2d ed. 2002). 
"The law of the case applies both to those issues explicitly decided and to those 
issues [that] were necessarily decided in the former [appeal]."  Ross, 328 S.C. at 
62, 492 S.E.2d at 68; see In re Grossinger's Assocs., 184 B.R. at 434 ("The 
doctrine applies to all issues decided expressly or by necessary implication.").
However, "[t]he prior adjudication does not preclude consideration on a subsequent 
appeal of questions expressly left open or reserved by the court."  5 C.J.S. Appeal 
and Error § 994 (2007); see also Searles' Adm'r v. Gordon's Adm'r, 157 S.E. 759, 
761 (Va. 1931) ("Every decision of [the appellate] court, whether it be upon an 
interlocutory or a final decree, is in its nature final, except, possibly, where [the] 
court disposes of only a part of the case at one term, and reserves it for further and 
final action at another."). 
6 See S. Ry. Co. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 319 (1922) ("The prior ruling may have 
been followed as the law of the case, but there is a difference between such 
adherence and res adjudicata.  One directs discretion: the other supersedes it and 
compels judgment.  In other words, in one it is a question of power, in the other of 
submission."); Slowinski v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 624 A.2d 85, 89 (N.J. Super. App. 
Div. 1993) ("Law of the case . . . operates as a discretionary rule of practice and 
not one of law." (quotation marks omitted)); 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478 (2d ed. 2002) 
("So long as the same case remains alive, there is power to alter or revoke earlier 
rulings."); 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 991 (2007) ("The doctrine is discretionary 
rather than mandatory.  Nonetheless, it should be disregarded only upon a showing 
of good cause for failure timely to request reconsideration of the original appellate 
decision, and only as a matter of grace rather than right." (footnotes omitted)). 
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The policy behind the law of the case is to "promote[] the finality and efficiency of 
the judicial process by protecting against the agitation of settled issues." 
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988) (quotation 
marks omitted).  "The rule of the law of the case is a rule of practice, based upon 
sound policy that when an issue is once litigated and decided, that should be the 
end of the matter." United States v. U.S. Smelting Ref. & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 
186, 198 (1950). "Law of the case rules have developed to maintain consistency 
and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single 
continuing lawsuit.  These rules do not involve preclusion by final judgment; 
instead, they regulate judicial affairs before final judgment."  In re Grossinger's 
Assocs., 184 B.R. at 434. 
The "law of the case" rule is based on the salutary and 
sound public policy that litigation should come to an end.  
It is predicated on the premise that "there would be no 
end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated 
appeals, compel a court to listen to criticisms on their 
opinions or speculate of chances from changes in its 
members," and that it would be impossible for an 
appellate court "to perform its duties satisfactorily and 
efficiently" and expeditiously "if a question, once 
considered and decided by it were to be litigated anew in 
the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal" 
thereof. 
While the "law of the case" doctrine is not an inexorable 
command, a decision of a legal issue or issues by an 
appellate court establishes the "law of the case" and must 
be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same 
case in the trial court or on a later appeal in the appellate 
court, unless the evidence on a subsequent trial was 
substantially different, controlling authority has since 
made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such 
issues, or the decision was clearly erroneous and would 
work a manifest injustice.7 
7 Lifepoint does not argue that this court's opinion in Flexon I was clearly 
erroneous or that the law has changed.  It merely argues that the facts this time 
around are substantially different. 
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White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1967) (emphases added) 
(footnotes omitted). 
The South Carolina Supreme Court has also recognized that the doctrine does not 
apply when the evidence is substantially different on a second appeal.  In Nelson v. 
Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co., 231 S.C. 351, 357, 98 S.E.2d 798, 
800 (1957), the court stated that the doctrine 
has no application where the facts relating to the question 
decided are substantially different on a second appeal. In 
order to escape the application of the doctrine, however, 
there must be a material change in the evidence.  
Additional evidence cumulative in nature will not take 
the case out of the rule and constitute a material change 
where evidence of the same class and character was 
considered on the former appeal. 
(emphases added).  Further,
[o]pposing forces tug at the theory that new evidence can 
justify departure from the law of the case.  It is easy to 
understand that new evidence can undermine the 
foundations of an initial decision. The needs for stability 
and procedural efficiency, however, counsel that a 
persuasive justification should be required to support 
consideration of the new evidence. Reconciliation of 
these competing forces calls for discretion, and the 
exercise of discretion has not yielded any basis for easy 
generalization. . . . 
. . . . Evidence that could have been presented earlier 
commonly is not considered, in keeping with the general 
rules that discourage slovenly or ill-considered 
approaches to the first trial. Beyond these relatively 
easy points, some decisions set a high threshold for 
considering new evidence, invoking the "manifest 
injustice" standard discussed below or even the standard 
for vacating a judgment. And other decisions invoke the 
mandate principle by ruling that new evidence cannot be 
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considered if it bears on an issue that was not left open 
by an appellate decision remanding for further 
proceedings on other issues. 
18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 4478 (2d ed. 2002) (emphases added) (footnotes omitted); 
see Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky, 606 F.3d 994, 1005 (8th Cir. 2010) ("It is 
not clear that any of the defendants' evidence was truly 'new' in the sense that it 
could not have reasonably been developed and presented in earlier stages of this 
litigation."); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 759 F.2d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the "newly 
discovered" evidence standard of Rule 60(b)(2), FRCP, in determining the 
appellant had not shown the existence of "substantially different" evidence that 
justified an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine); id. ("The law-of-the-case 
doctrine is designed to provide finality to judicial decisions.  It thus serves the 
same objective as the 'newly discovered' requirement in Rule 60(b)(2)." (citation 
and quotation marks omitted)); id. ("In this case, [the appellant] is seeking to 
reopen factual issues finally laid to rest by the Ninth Circuit in 1982 on the basis of 
evidence it could have discovered with due diligence at least by the time of trial of 
this case in 1977. The district court was fully justified in rejecting this attempt." 
(emphasis added)). 
Here, the second circuit court judge ruled Flexon's deposition testimony was not 
"substantially different" than the evidence before the first circuit court judge.  
Nevertheless, Lifepoint argues the interrogatory responses presented as evidence 
before the first circuit court judge did not show that Flexon was "importing 
[Georgia] patients into South Carolina or that he performed medical services in 
Georgia as an obligation under the terms of the Agreement," whereas the 
deposition testimony presented to the second circuit court judge showed that 
Flexon's performance of the Agreement involved both South Carolina and Georgia.  
Specifically, Lifepoint points to Flexon's interrogatory response, presented to the 
first circuit court judge, indicating that after the hospital's sale to Tenet, "many 
Savannah doctors stopped referring patients to [Flexon] because of Tenet's horrible 
reputation."  Lifepoint notes this statement "is limited to doctor referrals rather 
than any factual representation about the state residency of any patients actually 
referred." 
Similarly, Lifepoint highlights Flexon's interrogatory response indicating Coastal's 
provision of equipment was so unreliable that Flexon started taking his 
complicated cases to Memorial.  Lifepoint contends this statement "does not 
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evidence that [Flexon] was actually obligated under the terms of the Agreement to 
maintain medical staff privileges at Memorial or perform medical services for 
patients at Memorial," whereas Flexon's deposition testimony provides, for the first 
time, evidence that his performance of the Agreement involved more than one 
state. 
For these reasons, we agree with Lifepoint that the deposition testimony presented 
to the second circuit court judge shows facts that are substantially different from
the facts presented to the first circuit court judge.  In his deposition, Flexon stated 
that Lifepoint's CEO insisted Flexon remain on Memorial's staff.  Therefore, 
Flexon often had to do rounds at both Coastal and Memorial.  Unlike the facts 
presented to the first circuit court judge, these facts show that Flexon's 
performance of the Agreement required Flexon to provide medical services in two 
states. Further, the medium of a deposition was more conducive to a complete 
presentation of the facts than the interrogatory responses; hence, these two types of 
evidence were not necessarily "of the same class and character."  Nelson, 231 S.C. 
at 357, 98 S.E.2d at 800.
Nevertheless, the facts gleaned from Flexon's deposition testimony should have 
been developed before, and raised in, the hearing on Coastal's motion to compel.  
See Yankton Sioux Tribe, 606 F.3d at 1005 ("It is not clear that any of the 
defendants' evidence was truly 'new' in the sense that it could not have reasonably 
been developed and presented in earlier stages of this litigation."); 18B Charles 
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 4478 (2d ed. 2002) ("Evidence that could have been presented earlier 
commonly is not considered, in keeping with the general rules that discourage 
slovenly or ill-considered approaches to the first trial.").  Therefore, the second 
circuit court judge properly held that Flexon I was the law of the case. 
Additionally, the second circuit court judge properly concluded that Lifepoint's
failure to timely depose Flexon "cannot now be grounds for reargument of issues 
about which the parties spent two years litigating in the Court of Appeals."  See 
Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 408 S.C. 371, 387, 759 S.E.2d 
727, 736 (2014) ("Parties may waive their right to enforce an arbitration clause."); 
Carlson v. S.C. State Plastering, LLC, 404 S.C. 250, 257, 743 S.E.2d 868, 872 (Ct. 
App. 2013) ("There is no set rule as to what constitutes a waiver of the right to 
arbitrate; the question depends on the facts of each case." (quotation marks 
omitted)); Dean, 408 S.C. at 388, 759 S.E.2d at 736 (holding a party seeking to 
prove a waiver of a right to arbitrate carries a heavy burden and must show 
prejudice through an undue burden caused by delay in demanding arbitration).  
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Prior to the hearing on Coastal's motion to compel, Lifepoint could have (1) taken 
Flexon's deposition for the limited purpose of establishing the arbitrability of 
Flexon's claims and (2) presented its own motion to compel arbitration or joined in 
Coastal's motion.  Alternatively, Lifepoint could have requested this court to hold 
Coastal's appeal in abeyance until Lifepoint's motion to compel could be heard.  
Instead, the other parties' time and resources were devoted to obtaining a ruling 
from this court concerning the arbitrability of this dispute.   
We acknowledge the first circuit court judge's directive to Lifepoint to file its own 
motion to compel arbitration.  However, by that time, Lifepoint had already 
abandoned any opportunity to file its own motion to compel arbitration or join in 
Coastal's motion.  Lifepoint had kept silent for over seven months after Coastal 
first filed its motion to compel arbitration and over one year after Flexon filed the 
complaint.  Cf. Dean, 408 S.C. at 388, 759 S.E.2d at 736 ("We find that Appellants 
did not delay in filing their demand for arbitration. . . . [A]fter Respondent filed her 
formal complaint, Appellants moved to compel arbitration at their first 
opportunity.  Further, even were we to find that Appellants should have filed the 
motion to compel arbitration immediately after Respondent filed the [Notice of 
Intent to file a medical malpractice suit against Appellants], rather than after 
Respondent filed the complaint, Respondent has shown no prejudice or undue 
burden to her from the four month delay.").   
Lifepoint does not argue it was prevented from either joining in Coastal's motion to 
compel or taking Flexon's deposition prior to the hearing on Coastal's motion.  
Further, while Lifepoint's interests in pursuing arbitration were aligned with 
Coastal's interests, this did not excuse Lifepoint from taking the steps necessary to 
protect its own interests in a timely manner.  Therefore, whether the result is based 
on the law-of-the-case doctrine or on waiver, fundamental fairness requires 
Lifepoint to be bound by this court's opinion in Flexon I. 
Based on the foregoing, Lifepoint has failed to convince this court that the second 
circuit court judge erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration.  See Duckett 
by Duckett v. Payne, 279 S.C. 94, 96, 302 S.E.2d 342, 343 (1983) ("[T]he 
appellant carries the burden of convincing this [c]ourt that the trial court erred.").  
Therefore, we need not reach the question of the FAA's applicability to this case.  
See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 
S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address the remaining 
issues on appeal when resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). 
79 

   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order.  
AFFIRMED. 

THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur. 

80 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Ruben Ramirez, Petitioner,  
v. 

State of South Carolina, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2012-208626 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Appeal From Greenville County 

Edward W. Miller, Plea Court Judge 

G. Edward Welmaker, Post-Conviction Relief Judge 
Opinion No. 5337 

Heard June 10, 2015 – Filed July 29, 2015 

AFFIRMED 

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of 
Columbia, for Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior 
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Karen Christine 
Ratigan, both of Columbia, for Respondent. 
81 

                                         
 
 
  
 
KONDUROS, J.: In this post-conviction relief (PCR) action, Ruben Ramirez 
contends the PCR court erred in dismissing his application for PCR and finding 
plea counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain an independent competency 
evaluation before allowing Ramirez to plead guilty but mentally ill (GBMI)1 to 
assault and battery with intent to kill (ABWIK), kidnapping, first-degree criminal 
sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor, first-degree burglary, and committing a lewd 
act upon a child.2  We are constrained by our standard of review to affirm the PCR 
court's order of dismissal. 
1 See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-24-20(A) (2014) ("A defendant is [GBMI] if, at the time 
of the commission of the act constituting the offense, he had the capacity to 
distinguish right from wrong or to recognize his act as being wrong . . . , but 
because of mental disease or defect he lacked sufficient capacity to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law.").
2 The PCR court also found "a belated appeal from [Ramirez's] guilty plea [was]
warranted." In Ramirez's petition for a writ of certiorari, he argued the PCR court 
properly granted his request for a belated direct appeal.  However, after this court 
granted Ramirez's petition, Ramirez did not brief his argument that he was entitled 
to a belated direct appeal or address any direct appeal issues.  Therefore, Ramirez 
abandoned his arguments relating to the belated direct appeal.  See Rule 243(i)(1), 
SCACR ("When the [PCR court] has affirmatively found that the right to a direct 
appeal was not knowingly and intelligently waived, the petition shall contain a 
question raising this issue along with all other [PCR] issues petitioner seeks to 
have reviewed."); Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 20, 640 S.E.2d 486, 497 (Ct. App. 
2006) ("An issue raised on appeal but not argued in the brief is deemed abandoned 
and will not be considered by the appellate court." (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
Moreover, even if Ramirez had not abandoned his direct appeal arguments, we 
conclude he was not entitled to a belated direct appeal.  The only ground Ramirez 
raised during the PCR hearing addressed whether plea counsel was ineffective for 
failing to have Ramirez's competency reevaluated.  Although Ramirez asserted he 
was not advised of his right to a direct appeal in his PCR application, he presented 
no testimony or evidence in support of this allegation at the PCR hearing.  The 
PCR court's order dismissing Ramirez's PCR application did not rule on the direct 
appeal issue and Ramirez's motion to reconsider did not raise it.  Accordingly, even 
if Ramirez had briefed his direct appeal arguments, the PCR court erred because no 
evidence supports its conclusion that Ramirez was entitled to a belated direct 
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 3, 2008, Ramirez pled GBMI to ABWIK, kidnapping, first-degree 
CSC with a minor, first-degree burglary, and committing a lewd act upon a child.  
At the guilty plea hearing, Ramirez informed the plea court he was eighteen years 
old, had completed the eighth grade, and could read and write.  He claimed he had 
never been treated for mental illness or emotional problems.  Ramirez stated he 
was in court because he was "charged with serious charges and [he knew he was]
looking [at] up to life and these are serious charges and they are nothing to play 
with." 
Plea counsel requested the plea court allow Ramirez to plead GBMI because a 
psychological report indicated Ramirez understood what he did was wrong but was 
unable to control his behavior. The State informed the plea court Ramirez 
underwent a competency evaluation that established he was competent to stand 
trial. The State introduced the competency evaluation, which was conducted when 
Ramirez was sixteen years old by Dr. Mayank Dalal (the Dalal evaluation).
According to the Dalal evaluation, Ramirez denied a history of inpatient or 
outpatient psychiatric treatment.  Ramirez reported he attended regular eighth-
grade classes and admitted he had been suspended from school eight times.  
Ramirez claimed he usually received grades of Cs or Ds in school.  However,
according to the Dalal evaluation, Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) school 
records revealed Ramirez received grades of 92 in language arts, 95 in math, 80 in 
social studies, 93 in science, and 95 in health.  Ramirez denied a history of major 
medical or psychological problems.  Dr. Dalal noted Ramirez had some speech 
difficulties, which he attributed to a language barrier.  Dr. Dalal reported Ramirez 
"was oriented for time, place, person, and situation" and his thought process was 
logical and "goal directed." Dr. Dalal found Ramirez's "fund of knowledge was 
normal," his "abstraction ability was average," his "memory was within normal 
limits," his "attention and concentration were normal," and he "did not appear to be 
a danger to himself and/or others."   
appeal. See Lee v. State, 396 S.C. 314, 319, 721 S.E.2d 442, 445 (Ct. App. 2011) 
("Any evidence of probative value in the [appendix] is sufficient to uphold the 
PCR court's ruling."). 
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Dr. Dalal reported Ramirez was able to adequately read his rights and state the 
charges against him but he had difficulty with words like "solicitor," "evaluation," 
and "competency."  Ramirez told Dr. Dalal his charges were "serious because that's 
about raping."  In his report, Dr. Dalal opined Ramirez knew he could ask his 
attorney if he had any questions; however, he noted Ramirez could not remember 
his attorney's name.  When informed of his attorney's name, Ramirez was able to 
retain and recall the name during the evaluation.  Dr. Dalal reported Ramirez knew 
the roles of a solicitor, judge, and jury and he was able to communicate the 
meaning of "guilty plea, not guilty plea, and a plea bargain."  According to the 
evaluation, Ramirez could "state the importance of evidence, witness[es], and 
appropriate courtroom behavior."  Dr. Dalal determined Ramirez understood the 
charges against him, had the ability to assist in his own defense, and was 
competent to stand trial.  Dr. Dalal concluded Ramirez's diagnostic impressions3  
were: 
 
AXIS I: No Diagnosis 

AXIS II: No Diagnosis 

AXIS III: No Diagnosis 

 
The Dalal evaluation did not include Ramirez's intelligence quotient (IQ) score. 
 
Ramirez introduced a report from psychological evaluations conducted by Dr. 
Stephen Gedo (the Gedo report).  Dr. Gedo conducted the evaluations over the 
course of five days when Ramirez was seventeen years old.  Dr. Gedo obtained 
most of Ramirez's historical information "from collateral sources . . . due to [his] 
intellectual limitations."4  Ramirez told Dr. Gedo, "My mind is not right—I forget 
things after about [thirty] minutes, that's why punishment does not usually work 
with me."  According to the Gedo report, "[Ramirez] was reportedly mentally 
                                        
3 "There are five axes included in the DSM-IV multiaxial classification." 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 27 (4th ed. 1994).  Axis I 
includes clinical disorders and other conditions that may be a focus of clinical 
attention, Axis II includes personality disorders and mental retardation, Axis III 
includes general medical conditions, Axis IV includes psychological and 
environmental problems, and Axis V includes a global assessment of functioning 
(GAF) rating. Id.   
4 In addition to psychological testing, Dr. Gedo reviewed Ramirez's medical 
records and interviewed several of his family members.  
84 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
retarded from birth.  He reportedly did not begin speaking until age seven, and had 
consistent problems in school, being placed in special education classes, and being 
passed along even though he failed grades."  Dr. Gedo noted Ramirez was 
diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) when he was nine 
years old. 
According to the Gedo report, Ramirez's "[t]hought patterns were concrete, 
simplistic, and often vague.  He appeared to become confused easily, and his 
attention [appeared] to wander at times."  Dr. Gedo reported Ramirez "was clearly 
cognitively limited across the entire range of cognitive functioning," and his 
"[judgment] and insight appeared poor."  Dr. Gedo noted that although Ramirez 
"appeared to have no difficulty comprehending English, or responding 
appropriately to verbal or written questions," he had "difficulty understanding 
some words, such as 'conscience,' 'intercourse,' and 'ideal.'"  Dr. Gedo reported 
Ramirez "readily asked for explanations" when he misunderstood a word.   
Dr. Gedo's intellectual testing on Ramirez revealed Ramirez's IQ score was 
between 31 and 44, which "[fell] within the [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV)] category of Severe Mental 
Retardation." According to the report, personality testing on Ramirez revealed his 
"most problematic areas [were] . . . related to intellectual functioning."  Dr. Gedo 
noted, "Those who respond[ed] similarly often have cognitive limitations and 
difficulty with achievement, with interventions which may include retention in 
grade, and/or placement in special education courses.  Inadequate language skills[]
and limited reading comprehension are suggested."  Dr. Gedo concluded Ramirez's 
intellectual functioning was the equivalent of a four- to seven-year-old child.  
Dr. Gedo further concluded Ramirez conveyed the impression of an adolescent 
who had been "intellectually impaired[] and developmentally delayed throughout 
most, if not all, of his life," and he noted Ramirez had "a diagnosable 
psychological condition of significance, ADHD."  Dr. Gedo determined Ramirez 
was "likely to be highly malleable; that is, to be strongly influenced by those 
around him, and treatment which addresses the ADHD pharmacologically, as well 
as teaches coping/social skills would be important in assisting him to adapt 
effectively to societal standards, and to have better interactions with his peers."  
Finally, Dr. Gedo concluded Ramirez's diagnostic impressions were: 
AXIS I: [ADHD], Combined Type. 
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R/0 Adjustment Disorder with Mixed  
Disturbance of Emotions & Conduct.
AXIS II: Severe Mental Retardation. 
AXIS III: None known. 
AXIS IV: Problems related to social environment[,]  
educational problems, problems with access 
to health care services. 
AXIS V: Present Level: 35[5]  Highest in Past Year: 35 
The Gedo report did not include a finding regarding Ramirez's competency to 
stand trial. 
After the parties introduced the Dalal evaluation and Gedo report, the plea court 
found Ramirez suffered from "a mental illness," which included diagnoses of 
ADHD, "[judgment] disorder with mixed emotion of disturbance and conduct," 
and "severe mental retardation."  As a result, the plea court allowed Ramirez to 
enter pleas of GBMI to his charges.  However, before sentencing, the plea court 
noted Ramirez's "[IQ] level [was] as low as any [it had] ever seen."  Nonetheless, 
the plea court sentenced Ramirez to concurrent sentences of twenty years' 
imprisonment for ABWIK, kidnapping, first-degree CSC with a minor, and first-
degree burglary. The plea court sentenced Ramirez to a consecutive sentence of 
fifteen years' imprisonment, suspended upon five years' probation and mental 
5 The GAF rating is scored on a scale of 0 to 100, and a rating of between 31 and 
40 suggests: 
Some impairment in reality testing or communication 
(e.g., speech is at times illogical, obscure, or irrelevant) 
OR major impairment in several areas, such as work or 
school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood 
(e.g., depressed man avoids friends, neglects family, and 
is unable to work; child frequently beats up younger 
children, is defiant at home, and is failing school).  
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. 1994). A 
subject's GAF rating can vary depending on treatment and other factors.  Id. at 32­
33.
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health counseling, for committing a lewd act upon a child.  Ramirez did not file a 
direct appeal. 
Ramirez filed an application for PCR on November 2, 2009, and his PCR hearing 
was held on May 9, 2011. At the beginning of the PCR hearing, PCR counsel 
noted Ramirez was proceeding "solely on the psychological ground."  PCR counsel 
introduced the Dalal evaluation and the Gedo report into evidence, and the only 
witness he called to testify was plea counsel.6  Plea counsel admitted he obtained 
the Gedo report because he had trouble communicating with Ramirez and had an 
indication "something wasn't right with him."  Plea counsel stated Ramirez "was 
very naive," and he did not believe Ramirez "quite understood the gravity of 
the . . . offenses that he had committed." Plea counsel explained he did not believe 
Ramirez "understood everything that was going on." 
Plea counsel acknowledged the Dalal evaluation determined Ramirez was 
competent to stand trial.  Plea counsel agreed he paid close attention to the Dalal 
evaluation because Ramirez was having trouble comprehending "what was going 
on around him." Plea counsel explained he hired Dr. Gedo to perform a 
psychological evaluation on Ramirez because he did not understand various 
aspects of the Dalal evaluation. Plea counsel testified Dr. Gedo met with Ramirez 
five times and each visit lasted between three and four hours.  Plea counsel noted 
Dr. Dalal met with Ramirez on one occasion for about one and a half hours.   
Plea counsel testified that in preparing for Ramirez's case, he reviewed a Highlands 
County, Florida, School Board Assessment7 that indicated Ramirez "performed 
better than approximately [1%] of his peers."  Plea counsel testified that after he 
received the Gedo report, he consulted the DSM-IV and determined an IQ score of
70 is "the level for mental retardation," and an IQ score between 35 and 40 is the 
level of "severe mental retardation." Plea counsel admitted that despite the results 
of the Gedo report, he did not seek an independent competency evaluation for 
Ramirez; however, he admitted it would have been "prudent" to reevaluate 
Ramirez's competency.   
6 Ramirez did not testify at the PCR hearing.
 
7 Ramirez was born in Florida but moved to South Carolina in 2006.  The 

Highlands County School Board Assessment was not offered into evidence at the 

PCR hearing.
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On cross-examination, plea counsel stated Dr. Gedo never suggested Ramirez 
should be reevaluated for competency to stand trial.  Plea counsel asserted Ramirez 
"was never tough to communicate with"; however, plea counsel believed Ramirez 
"was a child . . . . I still saw him as a little boy."  He stated he explained to 
Ramirez what they would be doing in court on the day of his pleas and at the time, 
Ramirez appeared to understand.  However, plea counsel stated he questioned 
whether Ramirez understood what they were doing in court on the day of his pleas. 
Plea counsel testified that after he obtained the Gedo report, he determined 
Ramirez's inculpatory statement to police could not be suppressed, so he pursued 
GBMI pleas. He asserted that if Dr. Gedo had indicated an additional competency 
evaluation was necessary, he would have pursued one.  Plea counsel testified that 
on the day Ramirez pled guilty, he was comfortable with Ramirez's decision to 
enter GBMI pleas. 
After Ramirez rested his case, the State argued he failed to establish he was 
prejudiced by plea counsel's performance because he did not present expert 
testimony or other evidence demonstrating an independent competency evaluation 
would have found him incompetent to stand trial.  In response, PCR counsel 
requested the PCR court hold the record open and order Ramirez to undergo a new 
competency evaluation.  PCR counsel admitted the competency evaluation could 
have been conducted prior to the PCR hearing; however, he noted competency 
evaluations are costly and Ramirez's family was "of meager financial background."  
PCR counsel stated he needed to review Ramirez's DJJ records to determine if an 
independent competency evaluation was necessary before petitioning the PCR 
court to order Ramirez to undergo such an evaluation.  The PCR court determined 
"the record [was] sufficiently complete to make a decision on [the] issue as to 
whether or not [plea counsel] met the Strickland[8] guidelines," and it took the 
matter under advisement.
On May 23, 2011, while Ramirez's PCR application was still under advisement, he 
filed a motion to hold the record open to allow him to undergo an independent 
competency evaluation.  Ramirez claimed the new competency evaluation was 
scheduled for eight days later—on May 31, 2011. 
8Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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On August 1, 2011, the PCR court issued an order dismissing Ramirez's PCR 
application. In the order, the PCR court also denied Ramirez's motion to hold the 
record open, concluding Ramirez's competency was the sole issue Ramirez 
presented during the PCR hearing and his opportunity to introduce an independent 
competency evaluation was during the hearing.  Regarding Ramirez's PCR 
application, the PCR court determined plea counsel "provided credible testimony 
about his decision-making process," and it noted Ramirez had "ample time" to 
obtain an independent competency evaluation before the PCR hearing. The PCR 
court concluded, "Plea counsel sought an independent psychological evaluation, 
did not have trouble communicating with his client, and made the strategic choice 
to pursue a plea of [GBMI] when . . . plea counsel determined there was no basis to 
suppress [Ramirez's] statement to police."  The PCR court further concluded, "[A]s 
neither expert testimony nor a second competency evaluation were presented at the 
PCR hearing, discussion about the potential impact of such an evaluation is purely 
speculative." 
Ramirez filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion requesting the PCR court reconsider 
its denial of his motion to hold the record open and its dismissal of his PCR 
application and to consider the competency evaluation of Dr. Thomas Martin (the 
Martin evaluation), conducted twenty-two days after the PCR hearing. Ramirez 
attached the Martin evaluation to the Rule 59(e) motion.  According to the Martin 
evaluation, Dr. Martin consulted the following sources of information: police 
reports; Ramirez's 2007 handwritten statement to police; the Dalal evaluation; 
Highlands County, Florida, School District (the School District) records; the 
School District's psychological records and reports; the Gedo report; Ramirez's
pediatric medical records; and a two-and-a-half-hour psychiatric interview with 
Ramirez.  According to the Martin evaluation, in 1998, the School District 
determined Ramirez had an IQ of 57.  Additionally, Dr. Martin noted the School 
District found:
Ramirez's social adaptive behavior was . . . markedly
deficient . . . . He demonstrated poor communication 
skills, poor daily living skills, and poor social skills in 
follow-up adaptive behavior assessments. Overall, 
[Ramirez] was found to have a low adaptive level that 
only confounded his low intellectual ability.  Based on 
his multiple intellectual, language[,] and social 
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deficiencies, [Ramirez] was placed in the school district's
special education program. 
According to the Martin evaluation, Ramirez was "simple-minded, intellectually 
and socially deficient, easily confused[,] . . . highly suggestible with facts and 
history," and "easily manipulated into agreement."  Dr. Martin determined Ramirez 
"behaved child-like and immature for his age" and "appeared to have a very low 
level of intellectual functioning."  According to the Martin evaluation, "A basic 
cognitive examination revealed deficits in [Ramirez's] memory, insight[,] and 
judgment.  He was highly suggestible, easily influenced into acknowledging 
erroneous data, and appeared to react and give answers to please the Examiner."  
Dr. Martin determined Ramirez's diagnostic impressions were:  
AXIS I: 	 ADHD, by history 
AXIS II: 	 Mental Retardation, Full Scale [IQ]: 31-57, with  
significant documented deficiencies in adaptive social 
behavior. 
AXIS III: No Major Medical Illness 
AXIS IV: Psychosocial Stressors: Incarceration, legal  
issues, and separation from his family. 
AXIS V: [GAF rating:] 45[9] 
Dr. Martin concluded Ramirez suffered from "severe mental retardation with 
coexistent maladaptive social and language skills" and was incompetent to stand 
trial. Dr. Martin noted Ramirez could recite the charges once levied against him 
and vocalize "a vague and inconsistent impression of the purpose of a PCR action."  
However, Dr. Martin found:
[Ramirez] seem[ed] to have developed a blind trust for 
[PCR counsel], and vocalized his plan to follow his 
advice at all times, without question.  He also attempted 
to describe the basic roles of the [p]rosecutor and the 
9 A GAF rating of between 41 and 50 suggests: "Serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal 
ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious 
impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable 
to keep a job)."  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed.
1994). 
90 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[j]udge as it applies to his current situation.  [Ramirez] 
was not consistent or always accurate with his reported 
understanding of his legal case.  He was able to 
concretely [c]ite several pertinent facts related to his case 
and how they might be part of his PCR, but there was no 
true evidence or indication that he possesse[d] rational or 
abstract understanding or applicative ability that is also 
necessary to formulate a viable court presentation.   
Dr. Martin concluded Ramirez's presentation "was consistent with documented 
findings in [his] early school records and [the Gedo report].  In light of his history 
and current presentation, it remains unclear . . . how [Ramirez] was ever found 
'competent to stand trial,' to viably assist his attorney, and offer a guilty plea in 
2008." 
The PCR court denied Ramirez's motion to reconsider but sua sponte granted him a 
belated direct appeal. Ramirez filed a petition for a writ of certiorari from the PCR 
court's order.  This court granted certiorari.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On certiorari, we will affirm if any evidence of probative value supports the PCR 
court's findings and reverse only when an error of law controls the PCR court's 
decision. Sigmon v. State, 403 S.C. 120, 128, 742 S.E.2d 394, 398 (2013).  This 
court gives great deference to the PCR court's determinations of credibility.  
Walker v. State, 407 S.C. 400, 405, 756 S.E.2d 144, 146 (2014). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Ramirez argues the PCR court erred in dismissing his PCR application because 
plea counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an independent competency 
evaluation before the plea hearing.  We disagree. 
Trial counsel must provide "reasonably effective assistance" under "prevailing 
professional norms."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
Reviewing courts presume trial counsel was effective.  Id. at 690.  Thus, to receive 
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relief, a PCR applicant must first show trial counsel's performance was deficient 
based on a standard of "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms."  Id.
at 688. Second, an applicant must show trial counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced his defense by depriving him "of a fair trial . . . whose result is reliable."  
Id.  at 687. "Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance 
or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim."  Id. at 700. 
A guilty plea defendant is also entitled to the effective assistance of plea counsel.  
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); Hyman v. State, 397 S.C. 35, 43, 723 
S.E.2d 375, 379 (2012). The two-prong Strickland analysis applies to PCR claims
alleging plea counsel was ineffective.  Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. "In the context of a 
guilty plea, the deficiency prong inquiry turns on whether the plea was voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently entered." Taylor v. State, 404 S.C. 350, 360, 745 
S.E.2d 97, 102 (2013). To show prejudice, a guilty plea defendant must establish 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for plea counsel's errors, he would not 
have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.  Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-60; 
Hyman, 397 S.C. at 43, 723 S.E.2d at 379.  The prejudice prong "focuses on 
whether [plea] counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the 
outcome of the plea process."  Taylor, 404 S.C. at 360, 745 S.E.2d at 102 (internal
quotation marks omitted).  "In determining guilty plea issues, it is proper to 
consider the guilty plea transcript as well as evidence at the PCR hearing."  Bennett 
v. State, 371 S.C. 198, 204, 638 S.E.2d 673, 675 (2006). 
"Counsel must articulate a valid reason for employing a certain strategy to avoid a 
finding of ineffectiveness."  Vail v. State, 402 S.C. 77, 88, 738 S.E.2d 503, 509 (Ct. 
App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "Where counsel articulates a 
strategy, it is measured under an objective standard of reasonableness."  Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
"Due process prohibits the conviction of an incompetent defendant, and this right 
may not be waived by a guilty plea."  Matthews v. State, 358 S.C. 456, 458, 596 
S.E.2d 49, 50 (2004). "The test of competency to enter a plea is the same as 
required to stand trial." Jeter v. State, 308 S.C. 230, 232, 417 S.E.2d 594, 596 
(1992). "The accused must have sufficient capability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and have a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id.  "To show prejudice 
within the context of [plea] counsel's failure to fully investigate [a PCR applicant's] 
mental capacity, the [applicant] need only show a reasonable probability that he 
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was either insane at the time [the crime was committed] or incompetent at the time 
of the plea." Lee v. State, 396 S.C. 314, 320, 721 S.E.2d 442, 445-46 (Ct. App. 
2011) (fourth alteration by court) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "[T]he 
[applicant] bears the burden of proof and is required to show by a preponderance 
of the evidence he was incompetent at the time of his plea."  Jeter, 308 S.C. at 232, 
417 S.E.2d at 596. 
In Jeter, the applicant argued his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to request 
a competency examination that could have established he was incompetent to stand 
trial. 308 S.C at 233, 417 S.E.2d at 596.  Our supreme court found "[t]he evidence 
addressed at the PCR hearing was insufficient to show deficient performance on 
the part of [plea] counsel," noting plea counsel testified he and the applicant 
discussed the applicant's case and his options on several occasions before the 
applicant's plea.  Id. The applicant's family, who testified at the PCR hearing, 
never raised concerns about the applicant's competency to plea counsel.  Id. As a 
result, our supreme court found plea counsel reasonably relied on his own 
perceptions, particularly because he was familiar with the applicant from previous 
representation. Id. The court concluded plea counsel's failure to request a 
psychiatric evaluation was not outside the range of reasonable professional 
assistance when nothing suggested the applicant suffered from mental illness.  Id. 
In Matthews, a psychiatrist testified at the applicant's PCR hearing, and in 
describing the applicant's mental condition, the psychiatrist referred to the 
applicant's quick, nonsensical responses to questions.  358 S.C. at 459, 596 S.E.2d 
at 51. When the psychiatrist "asked [the applicant] where he was, he gave the 
quick, basic response of 'here.' When asked if he was in a prison, cafeteria, or zoo, 
[the applicant] responded, 'zoo.' When asked what his name was, [the applicant] 
responded, 'me.'"10 Id. at 459-60, 596 S.E.2d at 51. Our supreme court found the 
psychiatrist's testimony "clearly established by a preponderance of the evidence 
that [the applicant] was incompetent at the time he entered his guilty plea."  Id. at 
460, 596 S.E.2d at 51. As a result, the court concluded the "[applicant's plea] 
counsel was deficient for failing to request a Blair[11] hearing so that the [plea] 
court could examine [the applicant's] fitness to stand trial."  Id.  Our supreme court 
vacated the applicant's guilty plea and granted him a new trial, noting, "[Plea] 
10 The applicant's plea counsel informed the plea court the applicant had an IQ of 
60. Matthews, 358 S.C. at 459 n.2, 596 S.E.2d at 51 n.2.
11 State v. Blair, 275 S.C. 529, 273 S.E.2d 536 (1981).
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counsel's failure to request a Blair hearing prejudiced [the applicant] under the 
Jeter standard because there was, at minimum, a 'reasonable probability' that [the 
applicant] was incompetent at the time of his guilty plea."  Id.
In Lee, the applicant pled guilty to multiple charges in violation of his probation; 
however, before a probation revocation hearing could be held, the applicant was 
found incompetent to stand trial.12  396 S.C. at 316, 721 S.E.2d at 443-44. 
Subsequently, at the applicant's PCR hearing, the psychiatrist who conducted the 
applicant's competency evaluation testified the applicant's incompetence was 
caused by mental retardation. Id. at 317, 721 S.E.2d at 444. The psychiatrist 
further testified the applicant "had a basic understanding of his charges and to 
some degree the criminal process."  Id. at 321, 721 S.E.2d at 446.  The applicant's 
plea counsel testified the applicant appeared to understand their conversation about 
pleading guilty and the applicant never informed her of his mental health 
treatment.  Id. at 318, 721 S.E.2d at 445. The PCR court found the applicant 
"failed to prove he was incompetent on the day of his guilty plea."  Id. at 319, 721 
S.E.2d at 445. On appeal, this court concluded it was "constrained to affirm the 
PCR court's decision" under the standard of review because "[s]ome evidence in 
the record support[ed] the PCR court's findings."  Id. at 321-22, 721 S.E.2d at 446­
47. This court noted the psychiatrist's testimony that the applicant's "mental status 
dated back to when he was in school and he had a documented history of mental 
retardation was sufficient to show a reasonable probability that he was incompetent 
at the time of the plea."  Id. at 322, 721 S.E.2d at 447.  However, this court 
determined the applicant failed to show his plea counsel was deficient because plea 
counsel "had no indication of [the applicant's] mental status."  Id.
A. Deficient Performance 
The PCR court concluded Ramirez did not prove plea counsel was deficient 
because plea counsel "provided credible testimony about his decision-making 
process," "sought an independent psychological evaluation, did not have trouble 
12 The applicant's competency evaluation revealed he had an IQ of 61, completed 
high school, and obtained a driver's license.  Id. at 316, 721 S.E.2d at 444. The 
evaluation also revealed the applicant had once been hospitalized for behavioral 
problems, received mental health services, was diagnosed with mild mental 
retardation and disruptive behavior disorder, and had a history of setting fires and 
engaging in cruelty to animals.  Id. at 316-17, 721 S.E.2d at 444. 
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communicating with [Ramirez], and made the strategic choice to pursue a plea of 
[GBMI] when . . . plea counsel determined there was no basis to suppress 
[Ramirez's] statement to police."  We find the evidence in the appendix does not 
support the PCR court's findings on this issue. 
In Jeter and Lee, our appellate courts determined the applicants' attorneys were not 
deficient for failing to obtain competency evaluations for their clients because the 
attorneys had no indication of the applicants' mental limitations.  In contrast, here, 
plea counsel was aware of Ramirez's mental deficiencies.  The PCR court partially 
based its conclusion on the fact that plea counsel testified he "did not have trouble 
communicating with [Ramirez]."  However, plea counsel testified he had trouble 
communicating with Ramirez and had an indication "something wasn't right with 
him." Additionally, plea counsel described Ramirez as "very naive" and childlike, 
and plea counsel believed Ramirez did not "[understand] everything that was going 
on." Plea counsel consistently acknowledged he was aware of Ramirez's mental 
limitations, which is why he hired Dr. Gedo to perform a psychological evaluation.  
Plea counsel specifically admitted that after he received the Gedo report, he 
reviewed the DSM-IV and learned Ramirez's IQ score of 31 to 44 meant Ramirez 
was "severely mentally retarded."  Plea counsel also acknowledged Dr. Gedo 
found Ramirez did not begin speaking until age seven and presently had the 
intellectual functioning of a four- to seven-year-old child.  Furthermore, plea 
counsel acknowledged he reviewed Ramirez's School District report indicating 
Ramirez "performed better" than only 1% of his peers.  Therefore, unlike Jeter and 
Lee, here, plea counsel was aware of Ramirez's mental limitations before the plea 
hearing. As a result, the PCR court's finding plea counsel was not deficient 
because he "did not have trouble communicating with [Ramirez]" is unsupported 
by the evidence. At minimum, plea counsel's review of the Gedo report should 
have led him to seek an independent competency evaluation.
Moreover, we find the PCR court erred in determining plea counsel's decision not 
to obtain an independent competency evaluation so he could pursue pleas of GBMI 
was a valid strategy. Plea counsel's strategy was not objectively reasonable 
because if Ramirez was incompetent at the time of his pleas, he could not have 
been convicted of his crimes.  See Vail, 402 S.C. at 88, 738 S.E.2d at 509 ("Where 
counsel articulates a strategy, it is measured under an objective standard of 
reasonableness." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Matthews, 358 S.C. at 458, 
596 S.E.2d at 50 ("Due process prohibits the conviction of an incompetent 
defendant, and this right may not be waived by a guilty plea." (emphasis added)).  
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As a result, by pursuing pleas of GBMI in lieu of obtaining an independent 
competency evaluation, plea counsel departed from professional norms, resulting 
in deficient performance.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (explaining to prove 
deficient performance, an applicant must show counsel departed from professional 
norms). 
B. Prejudice
The PCR court concluded Ramirez did not prove he was prejudiced by plea 
counsel's allegedly deficient performance because he did not establish there was a 
reasonable probability he was incompetent at the time of his guilty pleas.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the PCR court relied upon the Dalal evaluation, "the 
[Gedo report's] description of [Ramirez's] understanding of the events leading up 
to his charges[,] and plea counsel's testimony regarding [Ramirez's] ability to 
communicate and understand the proceedings."  The PCR court also noted "any 
discussion about the potential impact" of an independent evaluation was "purely 
speculative" because Ramirez did not introduce an independent competency 
evaluation or expert testimony at the PCR hearing.  Although we acknowledge 
Ramirez failed to challenge the Dalal evaluation by introducing an independent 
competency evaluation at the PCR hearing, we are troubled by many aspects of the 
Dalal evaluation in light of the Gedo report and plea counsel's testimony.   
For example, the Dalal evaluation relied on Ramirez's self-reporting13 to determine 
he was in regular eighth grade classes; had normal memory,14 attention, and 
concentration; and achieved As and Bs in his DJJ classes.  The evaluation also did 
not include Ramirez's IQ score.  Conversely, the Gedo report relied on 
psychological testing, Ramirez's medical records, and interviews with Ramirez's 
family members in determining Ramirez was mentally retarded from birth and did 
not begin speaking until age seven; was previously diagnosed with ADHD; was 
placed in special education classes, which he passed even though he made failing 
grades; was "limited across the entire range of cognitive functioning"; had an IQ 
between 31 and 44, which fell within the category of "severe mental retardation"; 
13 Dr. Dalal did not consult the School District records, medical records, or family 

members to determine the validity of Ramirez's statements.  Additionally, Dr. 

Dalal did not indicate whether he conducted any psychological testing on Ramirez 

in concluding Ramirez was competent.  

14 Dr. Dalal also reported Ramirez could not remember plea counsel's name.  
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had the intellectual functioning of a four- to seven-year-old child; and was "likely 
to be highly malleable" and "strongly influenced by those around him."15 
Furthermore, plea counsel admitted he hired Dr. Gedo because he believed 
Ramirez "acted like a child," did not understand the gravity of the offenses he 
committed, and did not "[understand] everything that was going on." Plea counsel 
also testified a School District report found Ramirez "performed better" than only 
1% of his peers. 
Based on the disparate findings of the Dalal evaluation and Gedo report, combined 
with plea counsel's testimony, we believe there was at least a reasonable 
probability Ramirez was incompetent at the time of his pleas. See Lee, 396 S.C. at 
322, 721 S.E.2d at 447 (explaining a psychiatrist's testimony that an applicant's 
"mental status dated back to when he was in school and he had a documented 
history of mental retardation was sufficient to show a reasonable probability that he 
was incompetent at the time of the plea"); id. at 316-17, 721 S.E.2d at 444 (noting 
an applicant's competency evaluation found him incompetent when he had an IQ of 
61, had been diagnosed with mild mental retardation and disruptive behavior 
disorder, had completed high school, had obtained a driver's license, had once been 
hospitalized for behavioral problems, and had a history of setting fires and 
engaging in cruelty to animals).   
However, although we may have decided this issue differently, we are constrained 
by our standard of review to affirm the PCR court's finding Ramirez did not prove 
he was prejudiced by plea counsel's performance.  We find evidence of probative 
value (the Dalal evaluation) supports the PCR court's finding, and further, PCR 
counsel failed to introduce an independent competency evaluation during the PCR 
hearing. See id. at 320, 721 S.E.2d at 446 ("Any evidence of probative value to 
support the PCR court's factual findings is sufficient to uphold those findings on 
appeal."); Black's Law Dictionary 1397 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "probative value" 
as "[t]he degree to which one fact tends to make probable another posited fact");
see also Walker, 407 S.C. at 405, 756 S.E.2d at 146 (providing this court gives 
great deference to the PCR court's determinations of credibility).   
II. Newly-Discovered Evidence 
15 We find Dr. Gedo's assertion Ramirez is "likely to be highly malleable" and 
"strongly influenced by those around him" particularly concerning because those 
traits could have affected Ramirez's self-reporting during the Dalal evaluation.  
97 

  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Ramirez argues the PCR court erred in denying his Rule 59(e) motion because the 
Martin evaluation was newly-discovered evidence he was incompetent when he 
entered his GBMI pleas. 
As a threshold matter, we find Ramirez's argument the Martin evaluation was
newly-discovered evidence was not preserved for this court's consideration.  Based 
on our review of the record, Ramirez first made this argument in his petition for a 
writ of certiorari.  Therefore, this argument is not properly before the court.  See 
Kolle v. State, 386 S.C. 578, 589, 690 S.E.2d 73, 79 (2010) (concluding an issue 
that was neither raised to nor ruled upon by the PCR court was not preserved for 
appellate review).
Even if Ramirez raised this argument to the PCR court, he conceded at the PCR 
hearing the Martin evaluation would not be newly-discovered evidence.  An 
element of "newly-discovered" evidence is that the evidence could not have been 
discovered before trial. See Jamison v. State, 410 S.C. 456, 467, 765 S.E.2d 123, 
128 (2014) (explaining "[t]o obtain a new trial based on after discovered evidence, 
the [PCR applicant] must show that the evidence: (1) would probably change the 
result if a new trial is had; (2) has been discovered since trial; (3) could not have 
been discovered before trial; (4) is material to the issue of guilt or innocence; and 
(5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching" (first alteration by court) (emphasis 
added)). PCR counsel conceded the competency evaluation could have been 
obtained before the PCR hearing, but because competency evaluations are 
expensive and Ramirez's family is of meager financial means, he wanted to review 
DJJ records before obtaining an independent competency evaluation.  Therefore, 
even if Ramirez had raised this issue to the PCR court, he is barred from arguing 
the Martin evaluation constituted newly-discovered evidence based on his 
concessions in the PCR court. See Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp., 387 
S.C. 22, 45-46, 691 S.E.2d 135, 147 (2010) (holding an issue is not preserved for 
appeal when it is conceded at trial).   
CONCLUSION 
We are constrained by our standard of review to affirm the PCR court's order 
dismissing Ramirez's PCR application because some evidence of probative value 
supports the PCR court's findings.  However, we are deeply troubled that a man 
with severe mental retardation, an IQ between 31 and 57, and the intellectual 
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functioning of a four- to seven-year-old child was allowed to plead guilty and that 
a series of missteps by counsel at every level deprived Ramirez of effective review 
by this court.16  Based on the foregoing, the PCR court's order of dismissal is 
AFFIRMED. 
THOMAS, J., concurs. 
GEATHERS, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
GEATHERS, J., dissenting: 
16 At oral argument, the State conceded PCR counsel "showed up to court 
[without] the requisite tools to meet his burden of proof" and indicated Ramirez 
had other avenues of relief. Specifically, the State asserted Ramirez could file a 
writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of South Carolina, and it also 
referenced the United States Supreme Court's decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 
S. Ct. 1309 (2012). In that case, the Court held: 
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review 
collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a 
federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review 
collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in 
that proceeding was ineffective. 
Id. at 1320. Additionally, our supreme court has held that in rare circumstances, 
"when the system has simply failed a defendant and where to continue the 
defendant's imprisonment without review would amount to a gross miscarriage of 
justice," a PCR applicant may be entitled to file a successive PCR application.  
Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448, 451, 409 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1991).  We note plea 
counsel failed to obtain an independent competency evaluation before the plea 
hearing, PCR counsel failed to obtain an independent competency evaluation 
before the PCR hearing, and appellate counsel abandoned one issue and argued one 
issue that was unpreserved. 
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I respectfully dissent.  In my opinion, the PCR court erred as a matter of law when 
it denied PCR. 
"It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand 
trial." Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992). "This right cannot be 
waived by a guilty plea. The test of competency to enter a plea is the same as 
required to stand trial." Jeter v. State, 308 S.C. 230, 232, 417 S.E.2d 594, 595-96 
(1992) (citation omitted).  "This Court has held that to be competent to stand trial 
or continue trial, a defendant must have a rational, as well as factual, understanding 
of the proceedings against him and the ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding."  Hall v. Catoe, 360 S.C. 353, 359, 
601 S.E.2d 335, 338 (2004) (quotation marks omitted). 
Here, even without the Martin evaluation,17 the record before the PCR court 
demonstrated Ramirez lacked a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him and, thus, was not competent to stand trial.  As the 
majority opinion explains, the Gedo report provided that Ramirez was born 
mentally retarded, his thought patterns were simplistic and vague, he was easily 
confused, his attention wandered at times, he was "clearly cognitively limited 
across the entire range of cognitive functioning," and his "[j]udgement and insight 
appeared poor." Additionally, Dr. Gedo opined Ramirez had difficulty 
understanding words, and intellectual testing revealed Ramirez's IQ score was 
between 31 and 44, which indicates severe mental retardation in the DSM-IV.18 
17 Shortly after the PCR hearing, PCR counsel sought to admit the Martin 
evaluation. After a lengthy review of police reports; Ramirez's statement to police; 
the Dalal evaluation and Gedo report; school records; psychological records and 
reports; pediatric medical records; and a psychiatric interview with Ramirez, Dr. 
Martin opined Ramirez was incompetent to stand trial at the time he entered the 
guilty plea. Dr. Martin stated, "In light of his history and current presentation, it 
remains unclear . . . how [Ramirez] was ever found 'competent to stand trial,' to 
viably assist his attorney, and offer a guilty plea in 2008."
18 The DSM-IV is a manual of the standard classifications of mental disorders that 
mental health professionals use to make a mental health diagnosis.  I further note 
that "severe mental retardation" is the term used in the DSM-IV, the DSM edition 
used by Dr. Gedo in the Gedo report. However, the fifth edition of the DSM has 
100 

  
 
 
                                                                                                                             
 
  
 
Importantly, Dr. Gedo concluded Ramirez's intellectual functioning was equivalent 
to the functioning of a four to seven-year-old child, and the plea court noted 
Ramirez's IQ was "as low as any [the court had] ever seen."
Furthermore, as the majority explains, several aspects of the Dalal evaluation, 
which were primarily relied on to determine competency, are concerning as Dr. 
Dalal relied heavily on Ramirez's self-reporting; did not consult school records, 
medical records, or family members; did not indicate whether any psychological 
testing was completed; and did not include Ramirez's IQ score.  By contrast, in the 
Gedo report, Dr. Gedo relied on psychological testing, Ramirez's medical records, 
and interviews with Ramirez's family members in reaching the conclusion that 
Ramirez's intellectual functioning was stunted and he had the mental capacity of a 
four to seven-year-old child. 
Moreover, plea counsel admitted Ramirez appeared to lack a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding. See Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 597 (5th Cir. 
1990) (stating counsel has a duty to investigate his client's mental status when he 
has reason to believe an investigation is warranted "because, where such a 
condition exists, the defendant's attorney is the sole hope that it will be brought to 
the attention of the court"). In contrast to the defendants in Jeter and Lee,19 
concrete evidence in the record demonstrates plea counsel did not think Ramirez 
operated as an adult with independent thought processes and functioning.  Plea 
counsel clearly questioned Ramirez's competency and questioned whether Ramirez 
understood what they were doing in court on the day of his pleas.  He saw Ramirez 
as "very naïve" and as a "child," and admitted it would have been "prudent" to 
reevaluate Ramirez's competency.  Further, plea counsel readily acknowledged he 
was aware of Ramirez's mental limitations and that after he received the Gedo 
report, he reviewed the DSM-IV and learned an IQ score of 31 to 44 meant 
Ramirez was severely mentally retarded.  Plea counsel also admitted he reviewed 
Ramirez's school district report indicating Ramirez "performed better" than only 
1% of his peers. 
replaced the term "mental retardation" with "intellectual disability (intellectual
 
developmental disorder)."

19 Lee v. State, 396 S.C. 314, 721 S.E.2d 442 (Ct. App. 2011).
 
101 

  
 
 
Therefore, I would reverse.  Cf. Carnes v. State, 275 S.C. 353, 354-55, 271 S.E.2d 
121, 121-22 (1980) (reversing the PCR court's grant of PCR based on a finding that 
the defendant was mentally incompetent to enter a plea of guilty and holding the 
record reflected the defendant was competent to enter his guilty plea; "We 
recognize our scope of review in post-conviction issues, however we are controlled 
here by State v. Lambert, 266 S.C. 574, 225 S.E.2d 340 (1976), which holds the 
test for mental competency to plead guilty is no more stringent than [the] test for  
competency to stand trial.  It is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability 
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and 
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him." (quotation marks omitted)).  Unlike Carnes, the Lambert test is not 
met in the case sub judice. The record demonstrates Ramirez did not have 
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding or a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him. Moreover, as the majority noted, Ramirez has received inadequate 
representation throughout every stage of his legal proceedings.  In my view, to 
affirm the PCR court's decision simply perpetuates the injustice.  
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